626 SLEEP-WAKING. 



THE power of volition is exerted in two ways in dwelling 

 upon feelings or ideas, and in exciting muscular motion. (See 

 supra, p. 34-6. sq.) While we dwell upon a feeling or idea, asso- 

 ciation occurs, and the various faculties enable us to judge and 

 invent ; we remember, desire, &c., attending to some ideas and 

 feelings, and neglecting others. In dreaming, our faculties judge, 

 remember, invent, in general, very imperfectly ; or, if on rare 

 occasions, well, and even admirably, on a single matter, still many 

 of our faculties are in total, partial, or a certain degree of repose, 

 and as soon as our dream turns off to something else, absurdities 



matter and capacity of existence without it." (A Discourse on Natural Theo- 

 logy, p. 111.) It is very strange, however, that, when the soul is thus unfettered 

 or half unfettered, and thinks by itself, it thinks so oddly, and works, in the vast 

 majority of cases, so much worse than when it has the full assistance of the brain, 

 that we are accustomed, if a man talks or writes nonsense, to say he is dreaming. 

 Even the soul's consciousness of self often becomes false in dreams ; and we feel 

 ourselves " conscious of being, or having been, parties in acting and suffering 

 what not only never did, but never could, take place : " " indeed any dream is 

 more or less, may I not say considerably, a check upon the mind of the waking 

 man," and " when we are taxing recollection for by-gone events, we frequently 

 exclaim, Did I really do so and so, or did I only dream it.' " (Observations on 

 the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D. p. 107.) 



Locke, who argued well for us materialists, says, " How extravagant and in- 

 coherent for the most part they are ; how little conformable to the perfection and 

 order of a rational being, those who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. 

 This I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the soul when it thinks thus apart, 

 and as it were separate from the body, acts less rationally than when conjointly 

 with it, or no. If its separate thoughts be less rational, then these men must 

 say, that the soul owes its perfection of rational thinking to the body ; if it does 

 not, it is wonder that our dreams should be for the most part so frivolous and 

 irrational ; and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies 

 and meditations." (1. c. b. ii. ch. i. s. 16.) 



Democritus and Lucretius account for dreams by fancying that the forms or 

 spectres of corporeal things, constantly emitted from them and floating about, as- 

 sault the soul in sleep : and Baxter, by fancying that spiritual beings amuse or 

 seriously busy themselves in making our souls active in sleep : and I think 

 they had as much reason on their side as Lord Brougham and Mr. Colquhoun. 



