86 



LECTURES AND ESS A YS 



shows that, instead of introducing light 

 into our minds, this hypothesis con- 

 sidered scientifically increases our dark- 

 ness. You do not in this case explain 

 the unknown in terms of the known, 

 which, as stated above, is the method of 

 science, but you explain the unknown 

 in terms of the more unknown. Try 

 to mentally visualise this soul as an 

 entity distinct from the body, and the 

 difficulty immediately appears. From 

 the side of science all that we are war- 

 ranted in stating is that the terror, hope, 

 sensation, and calculation of Lange's 

 merchant are psychical phenomena pro- 

 duced by, or associated with, the mole- 

 cular processes set up by waves of light 

 in a previously prepared brain. 



When facts present themselves let us 

 dare to face them, but let the man of 

 science equally dare to confess ignorance 

 where it prevails. What then is the 

 causal connection, if any, between the 

 objective and subjective between mole- 

 cular motions and states of conscious- 

 ness ? My answer is : I do not see the 

 connection, nor have I as yet met any- 

 body who does. It is no explanation to 

 say that the objective and subjective 

 effects are two sides of one and the same 

 phenomenon. Why should the pheno- 

 menon have two sides ? This is the very 

 core of the difficulty. There are plenty 

 of molecular motions which do not 

 exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water 

 think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns 

 upon a window-pane? If not, why 

 should the molecular motion of the brain 

 be yoked to this mysterious companion 

 consciousness ? We can form a cohe- 

 rent picture of the physical processes 

 the stirring of the brain, the thrilling 

 of the nerves, the discharging of the 

 muscles, and all the subsequent mecha- 

 nical motions of the organism. But we 

 can present to our minds no picture 

 of the process whereby consciousness 

 emerges, either as a necessary link or as 

 an accidental by-product of this series of 

 actions. Yet it certainly does emerge 

 the prick of a pin suffices to prove that 

 molecular motion can produce conscious- 



ness. The reverse process of the pro- 

 duction of motion by consciousness is 

 equally unpresentable to the mind. We 

 are here, in fact, upon the boundary line 

 of the intellect, where the ordinary 

 canons of science fail to extricate us 

 from our difficulties. If we are true to 

 these canons, we must deny to subjective 

 phenomena all influence on physical 

 processes. Observation proves that they 

 interact, but in passing from one to the 

 other we meet a blank which mechanical 

 deduction is unable to fill. Frankly 

 stated, we have here to deal with facts 

 almost as difficult to seize mentally as 

 the idea of a soul. And if you are 

 content to make your " soul " a poetic 

 rendering of a phenomenon which refuses 

 the yoke of ordinary physical laws, I, 

 for one, would not object to this exercise 

 of ideality. Amid all our speculative 

 uncertainty, however, there is one prac- 

 tical point as clear as the day ; namely, 

 that the brightness and the usefulness of 

 life, as well as its darkness and disaster, 

 depend to a great extent upon our own 

 use or abuse of this miraculous organ. 



Accustomed as I am to harsh lan- 

 guage, I am quite prepared to hear my 

 " poetic rendering " branded as a " false- 

 hood " and a " fib." The vituperation is 

 unmerited, for poetry or ideality and 

 untruth are assuredly very different 

 things. The one may vivify, while the 

 other kills. When St. John extends the 

 notion of a soul to "souls washed in 

 the blood of Christ" does he "fib"? 

 Indeed, if the appeal to ideality is cen- 

 surable, Christ himself ought not to 

 have escaped censure. Nor did he 

 escape it. " How can this man give us 

 his flesh to eat?" expressed the sceptical 

 flouting of unpoetic natures. Such are 

 still among us. Cardinal Manning 

 would doubtless tell any Protestant who 

 rejects the doctrine of transubstantiation 

 that he " fibs " away the plain words of 

 his Saviour when he reduces " the Body 

 of the Lord " in the sacrament to a mere 

 figure of speech. 



Though misuse may render it grotesque 

 or insincere, the idealisation of ancient 



