io6 



LECTURES AND ESSA YS 



reasoning, in fact, cuts two ways if it 

 destroys our trust in the order of nature, 

 it far more effectually abolishes the basis 

 on which Mr. Mozley seeks to found the 

 Christian religion. 



Over this argument from experience, 

 which at bottom is his argument, Mr. 

 Mozley rides rough-shod. There is a 

 dash of scorn in the energy with which 

 he tramples on it. Probably some pre- 

 vious writer had made too much of it, 

 and thus invited his powerful assault. 

 Finding the difficulty of belief in miracles 

 to rise from their being in contradiction 

 to the order of nature, he sets himself to 

 examine the grounds of our belief in 

 that order. With a vigour of logic rarely 

 equalled, and with a confidence in its 

 conclusions never surpassed, he disposes 

 of this belief in a manner calculated to 

 startle those who, without due examina- 

 tion, had come to the conclusion that the 

 order of nature was secure. 



What we mean, he says, by our belief 

 in ths order of nature is the belief that 

 the future will be like the past. There 

 is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the 

 slightest rational basis for this belief : 



That any cause in nature is more permanent 

 than its existing and known effects, extending 

 further, and about to produce other and more 

 instances besides what it has produced already, 

 we have no evidence. Let us imagine [he con- 

 tinues] the occurrence of a particular physical 

 phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single 

 occurrence we should have but the very faintest 

 expectation of another. If it did occur again, 

 once or twice, so far from counting on another 

 occurrence, a cessation would occur as the most 

 natural event to us. But let it continue one 

 hundred times, and we should find no hesitation 

 in inviting persons from a distance to see it ; and 

 if it occurred every day for years, its occurrence 

 would be a certainty to us, its cessation a marvel. 



What ground of reason can we assign for an 



expectation that any part of the course of nature 

 will be the next moment what it has been up to 

 this moment i.e. , for our belief in the uniformity 

 of nature ? None. No demonstrative reason 

 can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence 

 of a fact of nature is no contradiction. No pro- 

 bable reason can be given ; for all probable 

 reasoning respecting the course of nature is 

 founded upon this presumption of likeness, and 

 therefore cannot be the foundation of it. No 

 reason can be given for this belief. It is without 



a reason. It rests upon no rational grounds, 

 and can be traced to no rational principle. 



"Everything," Mr. Mozley, however, 

 adds, "depends upon this belief; every 

 provision we make, for the future, every 

 safeguard and caution we employagainst 

 it, all calculation, all adjustment of means 

 to ends, supposes this belief; and yet 

 this belief has no more producible reason 



for it than a speculation of fancy It 



is necessary, all-important for the pur- 

 poses of life, but solely practical, and 



possesses no intellectual character 



The proper function," continues Mr. 

 Mozley, " of the inductive principle, the 

 argument from experience, the belief in 

 the order of nature by whatever phrase 

 we designate the same instinct is to 

 operate as a practical basis for the affairs 

 of life and the carrying on of human 

 society." To sum up, the belief in the 

 order of nature is general, but it is "an 

 unintelligent impulse, of which we can 

 give no rational account." It is inserted 

 into our constitution solely to induce us 

 to till our fields, to raise our winter fuel, 

 and thus to meet the future on the per- 

 fectly gratuitous supposition that it will 

 be like the past. 



" Thus, step by step," says Mr. Mozley, 

 with the emphasis of a man who feels 

 his position to be a strong one, " has 

 philosophy loosened the connection of 

 the order of nature with the ground _ of 

 reason, befriending in exact proportion 

 as it has done this the principle of 

 miracles." For " this belief not having 

 itself a foundation in reason, the ground 

 is gone upon which it could be main- 

 tained that miracles, as opposed to the 

 order of nature, are opposed to reason." 

 When we regard this belief in connec- 

 tion with science, " in which connection 

 it receives a more imposing name, and 

 is called the inductive principle," the 

 result is the same. "The inductive 

 principle is only this unreasoning impulse 

 applied to a scientifically ascertained 



fact Science has led up to the fact ; 



but there it stops, and for converting 

 this fact into a law a totally unscientific 

 principle comes into play, the same as 



