MENTAL FUNCTION 415 



which we look at standing before us and think of, is obviously an object 

 outside the mind, while if we then close our eyes and observe our memory- 

 image of the chair just seen we are evidently cognizing an object "inside" 

 our consciousness. Further consideration of the former of these processes, 

 however, shows us that when we looked at the chair what we really expe- 

 rienced was not a chair but a sensation of seeing, and that what we thought 

 of in both cases was a curious sort of mental representation of a chair. 

 Thus, we see that in both cases in reality what we know is "inside" the 

 mind, although we appear clearly enough to see the chair itself or its mental 

 representative at will. This is the view of the thoughtless, the na'ive 

 realism of the mass of mankind, and the view also, we may see, assumed 

 to be the better for physiological purposes though all the while believed 

 in reality to be a false view and one which is philosophically misleading. 

 Thus, we may go on and describe cognition as a process which knows 

 (at different times) objects both outside the mind and inside the mind. 

 It will appear shortly that without the inside-the-mind-object process 

 the outside-the-mind-object process would give us no knowledge worthy 

 of the name. The sensations might enter the mind from objects, but 

 without the internal process they would be of little or no use as knowl- 

 edge. We might then have knowledge of, but not knowledge about, the 

 objects. 



First, then, as to the process of knowing objects outside the passing 

 current of consciousness. To make this clear we shall have to consider 

 sensation, perception, and conception. These are the different aspects 

 and degrees of this fusion-process which is in itself single and devoted to 

 the sole end of making the conscious animal (man in this case) familiar 

 as may be with the parts of his environment. It will be seen that on this 

 process almost the whole fabric of language and so of civilization itself 

 depends. 



SENSATION has already been discussed sufficiently for our physiological 

 purpose. We have seen how various are the sorts and shades of the sen- 

 sations; that they are the simplest elements of consciousness, coming 

 closest to the physical forces of the environment and to the physical 

 protoplasmic basis of mind; that they represent the environment to the 

 individual only to a slight extent, being largely subjective in nature; that 

 they fuse together in large numbers for the most part so as to be indis- 

 tinguishable as units ; that they are hardly ever experienced in their pure 

 state, being always mixed with the other mental aspects (feeling and 

 will) in greater or less proportions; and that it is proper to consider 

 that the mass, so to say, of the sensation-stuff constitutes the subcon- 

 scious part of the mental process, close "down" among the nervous 

 impulses and possibly the other. protoplasmic activities. The sensations 

 represent the energy of the environment acting against the energy of the 

 animal, and it is on this account perhaps that they are so little objective, 

 that as sensations merely they tell so little about the qualities of objects. 



PERCEPTION. Sensation is essentially subjective in nature, while 

 perception is inherently objective. Let us revert to our former illustra- 



