154 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 



that they can adapt themselves thereto, etc., shows 

 that they are something essentially higher than mere 

 matter and even than a machine. That they have 

 power of recognition and conscious power of effort, 1 

 is, however, contrary to experience, which by all criteria 

 shows that the plants do not sensibly recognize, feel, 

 and will (see above, p. 108). 



In the animals, however, together with the self- 



1 This Haberlandt, upon whom we quite particularly depend, has 

 also not shown. What Haberlandt, by his classical studies, has contributed 

 thereto is stated by Wagner (Geschichte des Lamarckismus, p. 145), viz., 

 ' direct capacity of adaptation of the plants, power of self-construction, 

 correlative influence in the formation of tissues, the control of the entire 

 plant body in its finer and coarser construction through the function.' 

 All this was exactly taught by the Christian philosophers, often in quite 

 the same words. They therefore ascribe a soul to the plants, but cer- 

 tainly not one acting with consciousness, since all expressions thereof are 

 lacking. 



That we are not forced, therefore, to ascribe to the plants (and animals) 

 ' judgment,' ' thought,' etc., no one other than Haberlandt himself has 

 clearly shown. He protests, namely, quite recently, against the exploitation 

 of his words and experimental results by Pauly, France, and Ad. Wagner 

 (he gives the three names himself) in the following significant words : 

 ' If the results of the newer stimulus physiology and sense physiology in 

 relation to plants are brought in in the most comprehensive fashion for the 

 foundation of a psychobiology and plant psychology on Lamarckian 

 principles, then this implies an advance in thought which is not justified. 

 The possibility of psychical phenomena in the whole animal and vegetable 

 kingdom can be calmly conceded, without in the very least degree im- 

 agining that the most varied self -regulations of the organism, and physio- 

 logical and morphological processes of adaptation analogous to human 

 efforts towards a recognized goal, can be explained teleologically in the 

 strict sense of the word.' (G. Haberlandt : Physiologische Pftanzenanatomie, 

 Leipzig, 1909, 569 A.I.) 



That is excellently put. But Haberlandt might have added that his 

 investigations do not justify the ascription of consciousness to plants 

 generally, nor any sensibility, since his ' sense organs ' are organs for the 

 reception of special ' stimuli ' and nothing else. (See his 8innesorgc>ne 

 im Pflanzenreich, Leipzig, 1908, and Physiolog. Pflanzenanatomie, p. 520.) 

 (See above, p. 112.) 



