PRINCIPAL ATTEMPTS AT EXPLANATION 155 



regulations, adaptations, etc., which we ascribe to the 

 ' psyche ' of plants as their last cause, we note still other 

 faculties which remain entirely inexplicable unless there 

 be ascribed a power of recognition and of spontaneous 

 effort. This recognition and striving power, as observa- 

 tion teaches us, is equal or similar to our own if we 

 act as thinking beings, but incomparable with our 

 intellectual power and that of free-will. 



There does not, therefore, exist that continuity of 

 the ' psyches ' of plants, animals, and man. Thereby fails 

 the main argument nay, the only one in so far as 

 neo-Lamarckism would be a general, all-embracing, 

 and explanatory hypothesis of evolution. 1 



(c) Neo-Lamarckism may explain the adaptive 

 faculties but not the perfection of organization of 

 the various organic types : these are something 

 ' given/ and remain so during the whole geological 

 period of evolution. 



Webbed feet, long necks and long tongues, climbing 

 claws, etc., may be explained by adaptation through 

 purposeful efforts, but some sort of neck must have 

 been possessed already by the animal; and to some 

 one type must Bird, Mammal, and Serpent have 

 previously belonged. 



1 France (Pflanzenpsychologie als Arbeitshypothese, p. 23) confesses that 

 neo-Lamarckism (as he, Pauly, Wagner, and others represent it) stands and 

 falls with the continuity argument. ' Our working hypothesis rests before 

 all on the argument of continuity. It stands or falls with the doctrine of 

 Evolution. [(?) This should be : ' stands . . . with this argument ' ; since 

 with the doctrine of evolution as a fact would fall, it might be assumed, 

 every evolutional hypothesis (as an explanation).] The plant descends from 

 the same original being from which man also has been evolved.' 



