DETERMINISM 153 



and the effort which it costs us to do so seems to 

 prove that the process is actively original, and 

 is not the resultant of predetermining impressions. 

 The " determinist " theory, which denies the 

 existence of free will, is attractive to those who are 

 inclined to view Life as the result of mechanical 

 or chemical causes. If Life is simply a series of 

 reactions to external stimuli, there is no place in 

 it for either consciousness or free will. Free will 

 may be ruled out of existence, as an illusion, if 

 we dignify as the causes of our behaviour the 

 facts of our experience which necessarily condi- 

 tion it. The existence of consciousness cannot 

 possibly be denied. But it is regarded by this 

 school of thought as a functionless superfluity, to 

 be compared with the sparks that fly off from an 

 electrical machine, the shadow of a moving object, 

 or the humming of a top. Yet in spite of these 

 explanations we feel that we possess free will as 

 well as consciousness, and can use them for active 

 purposes. We can treat consciousness as an 

 accident and free will as an illusion only if we dis- 

 regard introspective observations which, in such a 

 matter as the appraisement of our mental facul- 

 ties, are an infinitely safer guide than inferences 

 that are based upon our experience of inanimate 

 things. The most materialistic of philosophers 

 does not venture to repudiate altogether the 

 promptings of these feelings. He will not deny 

 the existence of consciousness. But he distrusts 

 their revelations when they contradict the con- 

 clusions to which he is led by the inferences that 

 he draws from material happenings. We are, 

 however, compelled to trust to introspection for 

 most of the knowledge which we possess of our 

 mental processes, and it is unreasonable to discard 

 it, in one province of our enquiry, simply because 

 its promptings are out of accord with our experi- 



