THE PHENOMENAL AND THE TEUE. 183 



tainly will not be the true. It is not hard, therefore, 

 to credit that our practical world altogether (this 

 world of " things," as we perceive it, or of " matter 

 and force," as science represents it) is not the truly 

 existing one ; but is only the inadequate impression 

 we receive from a world of a different order. It is a 

 questicoi of our capacity to perceive. 



But there are other illustrations which may serve 

 to make this idea still more intelligible. We may 

 easily perceive how, not only a partial, but a uni- 

 versal feeling of the existence of that which does 

 not exist might arise. Let us conceive, for example, 

 the case of a person in whom the sense of touch was 

 wanting that is, who could see things naturally, 

 but had not the power of feeling. It is clear that, by 

 such a person, the appearances of things (which we 

 and all who have their senses perfect feel and know 

 to be but appearances) would be felt as having real 

 and separate existence. He would have no faculty 

 by which to test them and discover their true 

 nature, not having any apprehension of that solid 

 thing of which they were the appearances. Seeing 

 a book or a chair, for example, in various positions, 



