FOREWORD 



The Psychology and Physiology Panel of 

 the Undersea Warfare Committee has as its 

 mission the preparation of a general sum- 

 mary of the present status of knowledge wdth 

 reference to the role of the human factor in 

 undersea warfare. The present Report, al- 

 though extensive, can only serve to outline 

 the most essential aspects of the field for the 

 general information and guidance of those 

 whose decisions must shape the nature and 

 extent of a research and development pro- 

 gram in this field. The Report cannot do 

 justice to all of the many aspects of human 

 nature which must be considered in selecting 

 and training men, in designing equipment for 

 their operation, in safeguarding morale, or in 

 waging psychological warfare. The Report 

 will, however, serve a purpose of great value 

 to the extent that it focuses the attention of 

 military men on the advantages to be gained 

 by an alertness to the existence of human- 

 factor problems and by an insistence that 

 active steps be taken for their solution. Al- 

 though training in physics, chemistry, math- 

 ematics, and engineering is extensively given 

 in mihtary colleges and although many offi- 

 cers competent in these fields are available 

 for materiel research and development, the 

 opposite is true with respect to the science of 

 human behavior. It is as though wars were 

 fought by machines and not by men using 

 machines, so that a knowledge only of the 

 physical sciences need be required of respon- 

 sible officers. At the present time there is a 

 fairly wide-spread acceptance among mili- 

 tary men of the importance of human-factor 

 research for military operations, but there 

 are almost no military men professionally 

 competent to direct or conduct research in 

 this area, a situation which contrasts mark- 

 edly with the large numbers competent in the 

 physical sciences and engineering. Perhaps 

 the circulation of this Report will lead the 

 Services to increase the number of officers as- 

 signed to postgraduate study in psychology 



to the end that the Services may, themselves, 

 have personnel who are alert to the ways in 

 which a science of human behavior can be 

 utilized to increase efficiency and who are 

 capable of directing research and develop- 

 ment in this field. The National Military 

 Establishment cannot expect satisfactory re- 

 sults in the scientific exploitation of the hu- 

 man factor if all but complete dependence for 

 the formulation and solution of psychological 

 problems continues to be placed on civilian 

 scientists unaided by mihtary officers them- 

 selves professionally competent in the field of 

 human resources. 



Undersea warfare in some possible future 

 conffict will involve, not only the pro-subma- 

 rine operation of equipment by highly se- 

 lected and trained personnel, but also the 

 operation of all types of anti-submarine 

 equipment from the air, the surface, and be- 

 low the surface. There is no indication that 

 such operations can be conducted mechani- 

 cally and by push-buttons without human op- 

 erators. Rather, the high speeds of ships, 

 planes, and projectiles, the prolonged submer- 

 gence of submarines, in short the whole accel- 

 erating tempo of war, will place an extraordi- 

 nary premium on the scientific utihzation of 

 the capacities and hmitations of operating 

 personnel. The present Report, although fo- 

 cused on the submarine problem, is not hm- 

 ited in scope to this one Service, and the 

 principles which are presented are appHcable 

 in various ways throughout the National 

 Military Establishment. This very fact 

 should underhne the importance of an in- 

 creased coordination within the Services of 

 the research and development effort in the 

 field of the human factor. For example, re- 

 search on cockpit design for planes has a 

 relevance for the design of submarine control 

 rooms. Systems research on the CIC for 

 surface ships involves findings that should be 

 considered on smaller ships and on subma- 

 rines as well as vice versa. Problems of 



