snapped. A cable-suspended weight carried 

 the hull to 3,300 feet. Six years hence, Cous- 

 teau reports seeing the hull on an echo soun- 

 der "floating at anchor" 30 feet above the 

 bottom. A second hull was completed, and 

 DIVING SAUCER (SP-350) commenced div- 

 ing in 1959 in the Caribbean from its support 

 ship CALYPSO which carried a stern- 

 mounted, 10-ton, articulated, hydraulic 

 "Yumbo" crane. This was the first open-sea 

 "submersible system." With DIVING SAU- 

 CER in the hold oi CALYPSO, the submers- 

 ible could be transported safely for long dis- 

 tances at 12 knots, deployed and retrieved at 

 the diving site with the Yumbo crane and 

 repaired or maintained at sea in the support 

 ship's hold. At the sacrifice of great depth 

 capability, Cousteau brought flexibility and 

 wide-ranging to submersible operations. 

 Cousteau believed speed to be the enemy of 

 observation; he described the slow-moving 

 (0.6-knot cruising speed) DIVING SAUCER as 

 "... a scrutinizer, a loiterer, a deliberator, a 

 taster of little scenes as well as big. She gave 

 us six-hour periods in which to study accu- 

 rately the things below" (13). 



In one case DIVING SAUCER pushed tech- 

 nology beyond its limits; the case being its 

 original nickel-cadmium batteries which 

 short-circuited and burned early in the test 

 dives. The reason lay in the batteries' pres- 

 sure-compensated fiberglass boxes which 

 were poor heat conductors and allowed the 

 compensating oil to reach boiling point from 

 battery-generated heat. Brass battery boxes 

 with gas exhausts replaced the fiberglass 

 boxes, but gasses generated in the new boxes 

 and they too exploded. Conventional lead- 

 acid batteries replaced the nickel-cadmium 

 cells, and DIVING SAUCER proceeded to 

 dive with little further trouble from this 

 source. 



So far as can be determined, D/F/iVG SAU- 

 CER was also the first to use the positively- 

 buoyant pressure hull itself as a "fail safe" 

 mechanism. At submerged trim, the sub- 

 mersible was neutrally buoyant; to surface, a 

 55-pound iron weight was mechanically 

 dropped and DIVING SAUCER rose bubble- 

 like to the surface. 



The submersible scene, when TRIESTE 

 ushered in the decade of the 60's with its 

 record dive, may be described as "simmer- 



ing." The achievement of record depth by 

 TRIESTE was duly noted in the press and 

 trade journals, but the space program in the 

 United States completely dominated re- 

 search development programs. The Federal 

 financial climate, however, was friendly to- 

 wards other exploration-technologic endeav- 

 ors. 



PRE- AND POST-THRESHER 



(1960-1965) 



In the years 1960 through 1963 eleven new 

 submersibles appeared; their intended pur- 

 poses varied, but they were all relatively 

 small (2-man) and shallow diving (less than 

 600-foot operating depth); the exception 

 being the French Navy's bathyscaph AR- 

 CHIMEDE, a 1961 replacement for the aging 

 FNRS-3. Capitalizing on the lessons learned 

 from FNRS-3, ARCHIMEDE could dive to 

 any known ocean depth; its power supply 

 was increased for greater maneuvering; the 

 pressure sphere was enlarged to accommo- 

 date more research instrumentation; and its 

 float was designed for towing at speeds up to 

 8 knots. 



In these early sixties, private industry's 

 incentive to build a submersible is not en- 

 tirely clear. In the case of government- 

 owned vehicles (KUROSHIO II, AR- 

 CHIMEDE) the incentive is clearer: KURO- 

 SHIO II was built to specifically investigate 

 a national food resource; ARCHIMEDE'' s 

 purpose was to pursue deep-water scientific 

 studies and to conduct recovery tasks of mili- 

 tary significance. From the limited depth 

 and specific tasks, such as recreation, instru- 

 ment test platform and insurance claims, the 

 impetus for construction seems almost per- 

 sonal. In some instances, however, it appears 

 that a few larger corporations sensed a new 

 market in the offing. One must remember 

 that the time it takes for the idea to become 

 reality in the submersible business can be 

 considerable. So when a large, complex vehi- 

 cle, such as ALUMINAUT, is launched in 

 1964, the influencing forces and decision to 

 build predate launch by several years. 



Fifteen years had passed since the end of 

 WWII, and the written (14) and photographic 

 accounts by Cousteau and his associates on 

 the beauty of the sea and religious-like ambi- 



42 



