With some experience behind them, sub- 

 mersible owners were now in a better posi- 

 tion to assess their potential profits; the 

 outlook was not encouraging. To maintain a 

 submersible and its support ship on standby 

 is expensive. A small vehicle such as SEA 

 OTTER requires some $80,000 to $100,000 of 

 business annually to make a reasonable 

 profit (40). A mid-depth submersible of the 

 ALVIN-class requires between $700,000 to 

 $800,000, and ALVIN operates for a non- 

 profit institution. It was becoming clear: 

 Submersibles were expensive, and the long- 

 term contracts required to operate in the 

 black were less and less a prospect. 



In August 1968 a near-tragic event oc- 

 curred a few hundred miles off Cape Cod. In 

 the process of launching, a lift cable on AL- 

 V/yV's cradle snapped, and the submersible 

 fell into the sea. Miraculously, the crew 

 scrambled out before the vehicle sank in 

 5,500 feet of water (Fig. 3.27). The following 

 summer, ALUMINAUT was able to put a lift 

 hook into ALVIN^s open hatch and USNS 

 MIZAR pulled it back to the surface; ALVIN 

 was diving again in the summer of 1970. 



"/ will be honest with you. This Adminis- 

 tration cannot rush full speed ahead into 

 marine development programs. The real- 

 ities of national priorities and continu- 

 ing inflation demand Executive disci- 

 pline. All Federal expenditures have 

 undergone sharp review. In many cases, 

 we were forced to make painful reduc- 

 tions." 



— Address by Vice President Spiro Ag- 

 new 



Fifth Annual Conference of the 

 Marine Technology Society 

 16 June 1969, Miami Beach, Fla. 



What was suspect earlier was now reality: 

 There would be no "wet" NASA, and if sub- 

 mersibles were going to "make it," they 

 would do so because there was a unique and 

 necessary role they could perform. As far as 

 national priorities were concerned, Viet 

 Nam, domestic issues and established pro- 

 grams, such as outer space, took precedence 

 over an expanding deep-ocean exploration 

 program. While there was no cut in Federal 

 ocean funds, the level of funding increased at 



a rate to take care of inflation. Research and 

 Development funds for Navy submersible 

 leasing were increasingly more difficult tc 

 attain and justify in the face of other, more 

 pressing, military requirements. Still, the 

 impetus of the mid-sixties continued to pro- 

 duce additional submersibles. 



A second Westinghouse vehicle DEEP- 

 STAR 2000 and its support catamarar 

 SEARCHSTAR (initially called MIDWIFE 

 became available as a submersible system 

 Although small (45-ft LOA), SEARCHSTAR 

 was a unique part of the 3-man, 2,000-ft 

 submersible system, its design was hydro- 

 dynamically matched to the surface motion 

 and mobility attributes of DEEPSTAR 2000 

 (41), and it could be dismantled for rail or air 

 transport. Originally assigned to Westing- 



Fig, 3,27 ALVIN ai 5.025 leet as phologfaphed from the U,S, Navy Research 

 Laboratory s towed fish, (US, Navy) 



59 



