the Navy, now had a broad-spectrum sub- 

 mersible capability of its own. 



The DSSP was finding considerable diffi- 

 culty in funding not 12, but merely 2 DSRV^s. 

 A second 5,000-ft DSRV-2 would be launched 

 in 1971, but no further vehicles were 

 planned. The fleet of submersibles for assist- 

 ance in large and small object recovery was 

 reduced to one Deep Submergence Search 

 Vehicle (DSSV), and this never progressed 

 beyond a preliminary design contract con- 

 ducted by Lockheed. At an estimated $60 to 

 $100 million apiece (15), the DSSV is not a 

 likely candidate for construction. With 8 

 years separating THRESf/EK and the DSSP, 

 the sense of urgency and the emotions of 

 1963 were absent from R&D funding circles. 

 So much so, in fact, that the 1968 sinking of 



Ftg 3 30 The first of two US Navy rescue submersibles {DSRV-1) is launched m 

 1970 at San Diego, Calif (US Navy) 



another U.S. Navy submarine, SCORPION, 

 in 10,000 feet of water passed with barely 

 more than a ripple of concern relative to 

 THRESHER. In the hard light of 1970 the 

 need for even one DSRV was under close 

 scrutiny. Submarine accidents, where the 

 crew could be rescued, occurred at depths 

 where the McCann Diving Bell or escape 

 devices were more operationally practical 

 than a DSRV. In cases such as THRESHER 

 and SCORPION crush depth was exceeded, 

 and any hope of rescue vanished. And fur- 

 thermore, the practicality of a DSSV was 

 questionable when unmanned devices — suc- 

 cessors of CVRV — had reached a level of 

 competence where the advantages of man on 

 the scene were outweighed by long-duration, 

 less costly, unmanned remote search sys- 

 tems. 



As Vice President Agnew projected, pain- 

 ful cuts were being made, and deep-ocean 

 technology was feeling the surgeon's scalpel. 



To exemplify the shortage of funds for 

 deep submersible exploration, the Navy con- 

 tracted its last- and only-charter of DEEP 

 QUEST in April-May 1970 with the Naval 

 Oceanographic Office. This organization also 

 terminated its leasing of submersibles and 

 foreclosed on the prospects for a Deep Ocean 

 Survey Vehicle. Similarly, NEL and the Un- 

 derwater Sound Laboratory terminated leas- 

 ing for lack of funds. 



The cost of maintaining a submersible 

 made itself felt on the projected plans for 

 work submersibles in Navy ranges. Origi- 

 nally slated for the AUTEC range, SEA 

 CLIFF and TURTLE were beyond the operat- 

 ing budget of AUTEC and were transferred 

 instead to the Navy's Submarine Develop- 

 ment Group One (SUBDEVGRU-1), who also 

 had TRIESTE II and DSRV-1 under their 

 aegis. With the acquisition of these vehicles, 

 there was little further need of industry 

 vehicles to perform Navy tasks. 



Though the fact was yet to be recognized 

 by all industry, it was not long coming: Leas- 

 ing deep submersibles in the early 70's of- 

 fered no potential for profit. During 1970-71 

 the fleet of privately-owned U.S. submers- 

 ibles diminished: DEEPSTAR 4000 was al- 

 ready in mothballs when joined by DEEP- 

 STAR 20000; ALIMINAUT retired in 1971; 

 STAR I went on display in the Philadelphia 



63 



