Incident: The submersible was on the 

 surface for retrieval when the towing line 

 from its support ship fouled on the hatch of 

 the aft machinery sphere and tore the hatch 

 cover off. The sphere flooded and PISCES III 

 (P.III) sank stern-first to the bottom at 1,575 

 feet. PISCES V (P.V) was sent with a 4-inch- 

 diameter polypropylene rope that would be 

 fitted into P.IIVs sphere opening. P.V was 

 eventually forced to attach the line to the star- 

 board propeller guard. Six and one-half hours 

 were required to locate P.III due to an error in 

 P.IIVs depth gage, abnormal processing of 

 P.\"s gyrocompass and ship traffic interfering 

 with tracking and underwater communica- 

 tions. P.V finally homed in on P.III with its 

 sonor. The line attached by P.V was used as a 

 marker buoy on which a pinger was slid down 

 to P.III to assist homing, PISCES II and the 

 unmanned CURV each subsequently placed a 

 line on P.III and the submersible was brought 

 to the surface. 



Submersible: TS-1 Date: 14 October 1974 



Reference (21) 



Incident: During a pipeline inspection at 

 275 feet deep in the North Sea, a rope fouled 

 in the stern propeller oiTS-1 and held it fast 

 to the bottom. Six hours after fouling, divers 

 were able to cut the restraining line free and 

 the craft was able to surface under its own 

 power. 



Loss of Electrical Power 



Submersible: STAR III Date: August 1966 



Reference (1) 



Incident: During operations off Ber- 

 muda, the battery box oi STAR III failed due 

 to insufficient pressure compensation, and a 

 total loss of electrical power ensued. Subse- 

 quently, the main ballast tank was blown 

 and the vehicle surfaced. 



Submersible: GUPPY Date: NA Reference 



(1) 



motor resulting in a massive electrical short 

 circuit to the 440 VAC supply (cable power 

 from the surface). The power connector at 

 the motor had two seating surfaces that 

 were to seal when the connector was prop- 

 erly attached. Investigation of the flooding 

 showed a dimensional error of 0.012 inch 

 such that the connector looked seated but in 

 reality was not. Surfacing was accomplished 

 by reeling in the power cable as is normally 

 performed. 



Submersible: BEAVER 



Date: June 1970 

 Reference (1) 



Incident: During operations off Santa 

 Barbara, BEAVER experienced a propulsion 

 system short circuit and lost power to the 

 starboard propulsion motor at 1,545 feet. 

 Port and starboard trim was affected and 

 some arcing and smoking occurred inside the 

 pressure hull. A short circuit in a junction 

 box burned a hole in the starboard propul- 

 sion cable. The oil-compensating system for 

 the junction box tried to account for the loss 

 of oil in the box; this resulted in the loss of 

 the compensating oil which affected the vehi- 

 cle's trim. The smoke in the pressure hull 

 was not sufficient to warrant use of the 

 emergency breathing devices by the four oc- 

 cupants. 



Submersible: SP-350 Date: 1959 Refer- 

 ence (2) 



Incident: Operating at 50 feet, the vehi- 

 cle's nickel-cadmium batteries short circuited. 

 Owing to the poor thermal conducting prop- 

 erties of the oil-filled, fiberglass boxes the 

 compensating oil reached the boiling point. 

 The submersible surfaced by dropping its 

 ascent weight and was placed aboard the 

 support ship to allow the occupants to exit. 

 The carbon dioxide fire extinguishers were 

 unequal to the fire and it was necessary to 

 put the vehicle back into the water to extin- 

 guish the fire. 



Incident: Operating in the Bahamas, 

 GUPPY experienced flooding in a propulsion 



Submersible: TRIESTE II Date: July 1964 



Reference (8) 



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