The foregoing incidents demonstrate the 

 wide variety of related and unrelated events 

 which may lead to fatal accidents. Analyzing 

 some 20 different accidents/incidents, the 

 majority of which are included in the forego- 

 ing list, Pritzlaff concluded that the need for 

 good seamanship and maritime sense paral- 

 leled that of sound submersible design; in 

 essence, he has euphemistically restated Si- 

 mon Lake's observation that ". . . no one 

 makes a fool of himself . . . ." 



An equally interesting point also emerges 

 from the incidents listed above: 15 out of the 

 22 different submersibles involved were 

 either U.S. Navy certified or ABS classified; 

 the remaining 7 had undergone only their 

 builder's quality control program. So it 

 would appear that a certified or classified 

 vehicle is no more immune to accidents than 

 those which are not. Of course, one can only 

 speculate on how many more accidents there 

 might have been if those 15 were not certi- 

 fied, but the majority of the incidents de- 

 scribed were due either to the method of 

 employing the vehicle or from environmental 

 factors, not faulty design or construction. 

 This is not to imply that some form of certifi- 

 cation or classification is undesirable, it is 

 meant to place the cause of accidents in 

 perspective. 



RESCUE POTENTIAL 



In the event that a submersible is trapped 

 on the bottom, and egress is impossible, what 

 devices are available which may be employed 

 to rescue the occupants? In the final analysis 

 there are three means available: divers, 

 other submersibles and self-propelled, re- 

 motely-operated, unmanned devices. The se- 

 lection of which device to use is dependent 

 upon a host of variables, the prime one being 

 the nature and depth of the disability. For 

 this reason, it is difficult to imagine one 

 device satisfying all of the possible emer- 

 gency situations. Preliminary to a discussion 

 of the capabilities of these three devices, 

 should be a consideration of the rescue phi- 

 losophy: Underwater transfer of personnel to 

 a rescue capsule, or recovery of the submers- 

 ible with the occupants inside. 



Underwater Transfer 



In the United States there are presently 



two devices designed and operated for the 

 rescue of personnel from a stricken subma- 

 rine: the DEEP SVBMERENCE RESCUE 

 VEHICLE (DSRV) and the SUBMARINE 

 RESCUE CHAMBER (SRC). 



DEEP SUBMERGENCE RESCUE VEHI- 

 CLE-I & 2: 



DSRV-1 and 2 (Fig. 15.3) were designed to 

 mate with a stricken submarine, take aboard 

 24 personnel at a time and return them to a 

 surface support craft or a mother submarine. 

 They are air, sea (surface and subsurface) 

 and land transportable and capable of rescue 

 from 5,000 feet. The distressed submarine 

 must have a 6-foot-diameter flat plate (ma- 

 chined to specific tolerances) surrounding its 

 hatch to which the DSRV^s transfer skirt can 

 mate, pump out entrapped water, and 

 thereby effect a pressure differential which 

 holds it to the submarine. At this stage the 

 DSRV's and submarine's hatches are opened 

 and personnel transferred. The procedure is 

 reversed to unmate. No mechanical linkages 

 are required, but the area surrounding the 

 plate and hatch must be cleared of obstruc- 

 tions. A brief rescue scenario of the DSRV is 

 presented in Figure 15.4. 

 SUBMARINE RESCUE CHAMBER (SRC): 

 The SRC (Fig. 15.5) is a rescue cylinder 

 carried aboard all U.S. Navy ASR's (Auxil- 

 iary Submarine Rescue) and it is capable of 

 rescuing submarine personnel from depths 



Fig, 15 3 The DSRV-1 , capable ot rescuing 24 personnel from a military submarine 



at 3,000 feet The black and white bell on the underside is configured to mate with the 



distressed submarine (U,S Navy) 



695 



