Potentialities in the Control of Behaviour 
HUDSON HOAGLAND 
is order underlying the phenomena he is studying, other- 
wise his work would be pointless. He hopes to find the 
nature of this order. He also assumes that all forms of order 
have determinants and his job is to discover them. If he is 
studying behaviour of either animate or inanimate systems, he 
seeks the mechanisms ofthat behaviour. Since all natural phen- 
omena, including the behaviour of living organisms, are sub- 
jects of successful scientific investigation, the assumption that 
events are determined by antecedent conditions and by envir- 
onmental factors has been empirically justified by the success 
of science, especially over the last three centuries. I know of 
no scientists who work today outside a deterministic framework. 
Considerations of the age-old mind-body problem and of the 
nature of mechanisms, of purpose and of freedom have under- 
gone modifications over the last century, especially in recent 
decades, and these considerations are relevant to reflections on 
human behaviour and its control. Thus, to quote Julian Huxley! 
“The only satisfactory approach to the mind-matter problem 
is the evolutionary one. Let us begin with human beings. We 
are organizations of—do not let us use the philosophically 
tendentious word ‘matter’, but rather the neutral and philoso- 
phically non-committal term translated from the German 
Weltstoff —the ‘world stuff’ of which the whole universe is made. 
We then are organizations of world stuff, but organizations with 
two aspects—a material aspect when looked at objectively from 
the outside, and a mental aspect when experienced subjectively 
from the inside. We are simultaneously and indissolubly both 
matter and mind.”’ Huxley considers the possible evolution of 
: SCIENTIST operates under the tacit assumption that there 
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