130 Research and National Purpose 



agencies whose mission makes them dependent thereon. 



There are those who would argue that, given the inevitable 

 limitations upon human and economic resources, our research 

 capability would be more efficiendy utilized were it centralized 

 in a single government agency. This would raise the question 

 of whether the Navy continues to need an Office of Naval Re- 

 search; of whether it is in the national interest that the Navy 

 have such an Office. To this question, there can be, it seems to 

 me, no answer except an emphatic yes. The reasons are many 

 and basic, applying to other technology dependent branches of 

 the government with as much force as they do to the Navy. In 

 the end, these reasons all come to a focus in the continuing use- 

 fulness of the Navy. As an organization, it must maintain an 

 R&D program for the sake of improved methods and equip- 

 ment which perform in accordance with the requirements of the 

 day, permit timely introduction and do not cost more than they 

 should. As we have been told many times, only basic research 

 can create the prerequisites for such improvements. In passing, 

 I would note that the exercise of actually attempting to trace 

 such parentage is often more academic than fruitful, for the 

 trace quickly becomes dim and no rational sequence seems to 

 prevail. This is inevitably the nature of creative efforts, and 

 we should accept it, for in the end we seek ideas, basic answers 

 and basic data for which — once we have them— applications 

 are seen. Yet data by themselves are sterile; it is the ephemeral 

 idea that makes them useful. We must, therefore, remain in a 

 position to influence and stimulate thinking in the scientific 

 community along lines of ultimate Navy relevance. We must 

 have our own contacts with that community, as must — needless 

 to say — other branches of the government. 



Our own Navy laboratories provide one family of such con- 

 tacts. Their strength in recognizing new ideas of value to the 

 Navy lies in that their scientific endeavor is automatically 

 weighted toward areas of Navy interest by their environment. 

 Obviously, there will be other new ideas suggested more by 

 opportunity than by need, and we must certainly be able to 



