EXPLORATION FOR PETROLEUM 25 
therefore, to find them more honored in the breach than in the ob- 
servance. 
The usual sequence for initiating exploration in a given province 
is as follows. A wildcatter drills a well in a geological area not looked 
on with general favor. His reasons are usually best known to himself, 
but are frequently based on a minimum expenditure for leases. When 
the occasional strike is made (and in the case of prospect discovery 
by the drill, the odds, small as they may be, still favor the discovery 
of large rather than small features, as in the case of East Texas and 
Conroe), the oil fraternity moves in, and the exodus is usually pro- 
portional to the size of the strike and to the previously existing un- 
favorable opinion of the area. The exploration chief of staff is swamped 
(for the time being, at least) with demands for prospects to lease, 
explore and drill, and since too frequently the larger strikes are made 
in areas not in favorable regard, he is then in no position to make 
immediate and well-considered recommendations. In the absence of 
good strategy, the chiefs of line take over, and the results are fre- 
quently expensive and even disastrous. Very often a blanket explora- 
tion campaign is prematurely initiated with the method of highest 
available resolving power, with the average success and cost of a 
frontal attack in force upon a strong point. Tactics, at best, can 
hardly substitute effectively for strategy. 
And $0 what of today? In 1912, the problem was one of discover- 
ing reserves of potentially high priced crude. In 1935, with East Texas 
still a market-factor field, the problem is one of locating reserves of 
potentially low priced crude, with tactics of much higher operating 
cost. More than ever, the problem is one of strategy. By virtue of past 
experience, even if not because of continued success, the position of 
chief of staff or exploration frequently has been assigned to a tacti- 
cian, whose early experience was generally gained primarily in walking 
outcrops or piroguing to gas seeps, and whose interest in these newer 
tactics is academic, or even hostile. Proficiency in tactics is a necessary 
but not sufficient prerequisite for proficiency in strategy. Now, the 
problem is one of discovering and evaluating structures at depths 
of one to three miles. Surface geology and airplane mapping may 
occasionally be more than good honest fun, but in these days they 
are sporting and so hardly war. The higher cost of these new tactics 
(together with the expected low price of the oil that may be produced 
as a result) puts a premium upon good strategy, and good strategy 
requires an excellent working knowledge of the newer tactics. Ge- 
269 
