THE SPANISH MENACE 



thousand men according to circumstances. That part was tolerably 

 clear, although an experienced seaman would scarcely have chosen the 

 North Foreland as the best position for the job. But the Spaniards 

 feared Drake above all people, and it was known that he had a very big 

 part in our defensive plans at sea. So the admiral had instructions to 

 attack him if he were encountered near the Chops of the Channel, or if 

 he pursued too closely. On the other hand, there were also instructions 

 to avoid an action on account of the necessity of preserving the men for 

 the planned co-operation with the Duke of Parma. A touch of under- 

 standing was contained in the warning that the English were superior in 

 their gunpery, and therefore the Spaniards were to make every eflEort to 

 close. Once Parma was landed the fleet was to take up a position at 

 the mouth of the Thames and co-operate with the land commander, who 

 was the senior, as much as possible. The whole plan shows how little 

 the Spaniards understood the first principles of sea warfare and how little 

 they had learned the history of England, for they proposed to invade 

 while a fleet was left in being and that has always been proved exceed- 

 ingly dangerous or impossible. There was a supplementary order which 

 directed the Duke, if Parma's invasion were prevented, to make himself 

 master of the Isle of Wight as a base for various raiding operations. The 

 rest of the instructions concerned discipline, the stern suppression of 

 blasphemy, and a score of other items which would not appear to come 

 within the King's province. 

 Changes of Plan. 



But even this plan, vague as it was in some details and minute in 

 others, was not allowed to stand, and alterations were continually being 

 made. At first it had been planned to hug the British coast as much as 

 possible and carefully avoid the shallows of France and Flanders, where 

 the manoeuvring of such a huge fleet would be a very difficult matter. 

 But before long this was changed, and it was arranged that Parma was to 

 join the fleet with his ships and men first at Dunkirk and then at Calais. 

 The plan would alter matters considerably, one eflfect being that it would 

 probably give the glory to the admiral rather than to the general. 

 Various other changes were effected. 



English Preparations. 



While this mighty Armada was preparing in Spain, the English were 

 well aware of what was going on and were taking measures to defend 

 themselves. Land and sea forces were raised and trained, but there 

 appears to have been little understanding of how much would fall on 

 the shoulders of the Navy, and the ships were miserably supplied with 

 stores and munitions, more miserably even than the state of the Royal 

 Treasury would warrant. The ships were tied to British waters partly 

 by the authorities' fear that if they ventured far afield the Spaniards 

 would slip past them, and partly because they had not enough stores for 

 any sort of a long cruise. Nearly all the English leaders pleaded to be 

 allowed to hunt the Spaniard on his own coast ; they argued that even 

 if they did not defeat him he would nevei dare proceed with the invasion 



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