THE NAVY OF THE RESTORATION 



attitude the Dutch planned a descent on the English coasts with the 

 co-operation of the French, but finally were left to carry it out them- 

 selves. By this time Charles II had greatly disappointed his seamen by 

 forgetting all his early promises and letting them get into a condition as 

 regards pay and food that was no better than under the Commonwealth. 

 A number of British seamen, therefore, deserted to Holland and it was 

 by their aid that the Dutch were able to pick their way through the 

 shoals and shallows at the entrance to the Medway and attack the 

 British Fleet that was laid up there. The ships were without men and 

 many of them almost without guns, but they put up what must be 

 regarded as a remarkably gallant defence. The odds were far too 

 heavy, however, and a number of men-of-war were destroyed while 

 some, including the Royal Charles, of which we were so proud, were 

 taken across to Holland in triumph. After that and other descents on 

 the coast Charles was more reasonable and the Peace of Breda in July, 

 1667, concluded the struggle. 

 The Third Dutch War. 



After the Peace of Breda the Navy lapsed into an exaggerated 

 peace routine which sapped the whole efficiency of the Fleet. In 1670, 

 however, Charles II signed a secret treaty at Dover by which he agreed 

 to lend the Navy to Louis XIV for his purposes against the Dutch, a 

 disgraceful proceeding which was disastrous to our interests. Louis XIV 

 meant to make France territorially the same as ancient Gaul, with the 

 Rhine as its frontier, and Charles set about helping him, forgetful of the 

 appalling danger to England of a French Rhine Delta. The determina- 

 tion of the Dutch had prevented his capture of Antwerp threatening 

 us in the way that it might have done, but Louis was not contented and 

 hired Charles to cut his own throat. The fleet which put out to his 

 assistance in 1672 was under the command of the Duke of York with 

 D'Estrees as Second in Command of the French contingent and Lord 

 Sandwich as Rear-Admiral. It is an ignoble fact that the French had 

 no intention of risking their infant navy more than was absolutely neces- 

 sary, and the presence of a French force was really for no other purpose 

 than to make sure that England earned her pay. 



The Battle of Solebay. 



Against the advice of Sandwich the allies allowed themselves to 

 be caught by De Ruyter on a lee shore off Solebay, and at the very 

 beginning of the attack the French made matters worse by sailing away 

 from our ships. De Ruyter was not a man to let an opportunity pass 

 and immediately put himself between the two fleets. He detached a 

 small squadron to watch the French and then tackled us with a slightly 

 superior fleet. The greatest loss to the British was Pepys's patron, 

 the Earl of Sandwich, whose flagship, the Royal James, was grappled 

 by a French fire-ship and was soon ablaze fore and aft. There are two 

 stories of his death — one that he stood on his quarter-deck with two or 

 three devoted juniors until the flames drove him overboard and he was 

 drowned, and the other that he got away in an overloaded boat which 



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