SCIENCE AND MIND 263 



whiteness ; it is simply an abstraction of certain 

 properties or qualities we suppose or assume to be 

 present in all matter. We find that material 

 objects differ in colour and shape, and we strip 

 them of all points of unlikeness, and find that 

 there remains a point in which they all agree, i.e. 

 particles in motion ; and we talk as if the particles 

 in motion had an objective existence : they have 

 not ; they are merely an hypostatised concept — a 

 summum genus. Sir William Hamilton defines a 

 concept as " the cognition of general character, 

 point or points in which a plurality of objects 

 coincide" ; and molecular motion is just such a 

 concept. To try to explain thought or conception 

 by a concept is obviously absurd. 



Suppose we put aside the abstract idea, motion. 

 Suppose we allow the particular molecules concrete 

 existence ; suppose we make each of them, not a 

 hypothetical dynamic basis of matter, but material, 

 with the ordinary tangible and visible qualities of 

 matter (which, of course, is quite contrary to the 

 ordinary conception of matter as motion) ; suppose 

 we are able to magnify or modify the molecules 

 till they become apparent to the sight and touch — 

 1 do not think that will help us to understand the 

 causal connection between the particles and the 

 thought ; for the particles are merely the sum of 

 their qualities, and every quality is a subjective 



