II EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. 57 



pressed, understanding; and having made the 

 very important advance upon wolf society, that 

 they agree to use the force of the whole body 

 against individuals who violate it and in favour 

 of those who observe it. This observance of a 

 common understanding, with the consequent dis- 

 tribution of punishments and rewards according 

 to accepted rules, received the name of justice, 

 while the contrary was called injustice. Early 

 ethics did not take much note of the animus of 

 the violator of the rules. But civiHzation could 

 not advance far, without the establishment of a 

 capital distinction between the case of involun- 

 tary and that of wilful misdeed; between a merely 

 wrong action and a guilty one. And, with in- 

 creasing refinement of moral appreciation, the 

 problem of desert, which arises out of this distinc- 

 tion, acquired more and more theoretical and prac- 

 tical importance. If life must be given for life, 

 yet it was recognized that the unintentional slayer 

 did not altogether deserve death; and, by a sort 

 of compromise between the public and the private 

 conception of justice, a sanctuary was provided in 

 which he might take refuge from the avenger of 

 blood. 



The idea of justice thus underwent a gradual 

 sublimation from punishment and reward accord- 

 ing to acts, to punishment and reward according 

 to desert; or, in other words, according to motive. 

 Righteousness, that is, action from right motive, 



