m SCIENCE AND MORALS. 121 



lie in anything which my five senses enable me to 

 discover in the pages of his article, and of which 

 an orang-outang might be just as acutely sensible. 

 No, it lies in an appreciation of literary form and 

 logical structure by sesthetic and intellectual fac- 

 ulties which are not senses, and which are not un- 

 frequently sadly wanting where the senses are in 

 full vigour. My poor relation may beat me in the 

 matter of sensation; but I am quite confident that, 

 when style and syllogisms are to be dealt with, he 

 is nowhere. 



If there is anything in the world which I do 

 firmly believe in, it is the universal validity of the 

 law of causation; but that universality cannot be 

 proved by any amount of experience, let alone 

 that which comes to us through the senses. And 

 when an effort of volition changes the current of 

 my thoughts, or when an idea calls up another 

 associated idea, I have not the slightest doubt 

 that the process to which the first of the phe- 

 nomena, in each case, is due stands in the relation 

 of cause to the second. Yet the attempt to verify 

 this belief by sensation would be sheer lunacy. 

 Now I am quite sure that Mr. Lilly does not 

 doubt my sanity; and the only alternative seems 

 to be the admission that his first proposition is 

 erroneous. 



The second thesis charges me with putting 

 aside " as unverifiable " " everything beyond the 

 bounds of physical science." Again I say, No. 



