in SCIENCE AND MORALS. 133 



Spiritualism, it lands me in even greater dijOBicul- 

 ties when I want to get change for its notes-of- 

 hand in the solid coin of reality. For the as- 

 sumed substantial entity, spirit, which is supposed 

 to underlie the phenomena of consciousness, as 

 matter underlies those of physical nature, leaves 

 not even a geometrical ghost when these phenom- 

 ena are abstracted. And, even if we suppose the 

 existence of such an entity apart from qualities — 

 that is to say, a bare existence — for mind, how does 

 anybody know that it differs from that other en- 

 tity, apart from qualities, which is the supposed 

 substratum of matter? Spiritualism is, after all, 

 little better than Materialism turned upside down. 

 And if I try to think of the " spirit " which a man, 

 by this hypothesis, carries about under his hat, as 

 something devoid of relation to space, and as 

 something indivisible, even in thought, while it is, 

 at the same time, supposed to be in that place and 

 to be possessed of half a dozen different faculties, 

 I confess I get quite lost. 



As I have said elsewhere, if I were forced to 

 choose between Materialism and Idealism, I should 

 elect for the latter; and I certainly would have 

 nothing to do with the effete mythology of Spirit- 

 ualism. But I am not aware that I am under 

 any compulsion to choose either the one or the 

 other. I have always entertained a strong sus- 

 picion that the sage who maintained that man is 

 the measure of the universe was sadly in the 



