LOGIC Oh RECErrs. 45 



The question, then, which we have to consider is whether 

 there is a difference of kind, or only a difference of degree. 

 between a reccpt and a concept. This is really the question 

 with which the whole of the present volume will be concerned, 

 and as its adequate treatment will necessitate somewhat 



Empfindungen ergibt sich die Wahymhmung eitus Dinges: erst indem wir die 

 weisse Farbe sehcn, die Harte fuhleii und den sussen Geschmack empfinden, 

 erkennen wir ein Stlick Zucker" {Das Leben der .Stv/^ (1857), 8, ii. 66). This 

 and other passages in the same work follow the teaching of Steinthal ; e.g. "Die 

 Anschauung von einem Dinge ist der Complex der sammtlichen Empfindungser- 

 kenntnisse, die wir von einem Dinge haben ... die Anschauung ist cine Synthesis, 

 aber eine unmittelbare, die durch die Einheit der Seele gegeben ist." Ami, 

 following both these writers, Friedrich Miiller says, *' Diese Sammlung und 

 Einigung der verschiedenen Empfindungen gemass der in den Dingen verbun- 

 denen Eigenschaften heisst Anschauung " ( Gnindriss der Sprach-Missmschaft, i. 26). 

 On the other hand, their brother philologist, Geiger, strongly objects to this use 

 of the term Anschauung, under which, he says, " wird theils etwas von der 

 Sinneswahrnehmung gar nicht Unterschicdenes verstanden, theils auch ein dunkles 

 Etwas, welches, ohne dass die Hedingungen und Ursachen zu erkennen sind, die 

 Einheit der Wahrnehmungen zu kleineren und grossern Complexcn bewirken soil. 

 ... So dass ich eine solche ' Synthesis ' nicht auch bei deni Thiere ganz ebenso 

 wie bei dem Menschen voraussetze : ich glaube im Gcgentheile, dass es sich mit 

 der Sprache erst entwickelt " (Urspnoig der Sprache, 177, 17S). Now, I have 

 quoted these various passages because they serve to render, in a brief and 

 instructive form, the different views which may be taken on a comparatively 

 simple matter owing to the want of well-defined terms. No doubt the use of the 

 term Anschauung by the above writers is unfortunate ; but by it they appear to me 

 clearly to indicate a nascent idea of what I mean by a recept. They all three fail 

 to bring out this idea in its fulness, ina'^much as they restrict the powers of 

 non-conceptual "synthesis" to a grouping of simjjle perceptions furnisheil by 

 different sense-organs, instead of extending it to a synthesis of syntheses of 

 perceptions, whether furnished by the same or also by different senses. But these 

 three philologists are all on the right psychological track, and their critic Geiger 

 is quite wrong in saying that there can be no synthesis of (non-conceptual) ideas 

 without the aid of speech. As a matter of fact the dunkles Etwas which he 

 complains of his predecessors as importing into the ideation of animals, is an Etwas 

 which, when brought out into clearer light, is fraught with the highest importance. 

 For, as we shall subsequently see, it is nothing less than the needful psychological 

 condition to the subsequent development both of speech and thought. The term 

 Apperception as used by some German psychologists is also inclusive of what 

 I mean by receptual ideation. IJut as it is also inclusive of conceptual, nothing 

 would here be gained by its ado|>tion. Indeed F. Midler expressly restricts its 

 meaning to conceptual ideation, for he says, " Alle psychischen I'rocesse bis 

 einschliesslich zur Perception lassen sich ohne Sprache ausfuhren und voll- 

 kommcn bcgreifen, die Apperception dagegen lasst sich nur an tier Ilaiul '11 

 Sprache dcnkcn " (loc. cit. L, 29). 



