LOGIC OF RECEPTS. 69 



tion as ever>'\vhcrc the same in kind, we must conclude that 

 the groupings of rcccpts stand to those of concepts in much 

 the same relation as the groupings of percepts do to those of 

 rccepts. In each case it is the lower order of grouping which 

 furnishes material for the higher: and the object of this 

 chapter has been to show, first, that the unintentional 

 grouping which is distinctive of rcccpts may be carried to 

 a wonderful pitch of perfection without any aid from the 

 intentional grouping which is distinctive of concepts ; and, 

 second, that from the very beginning conscious ideation has 

 been concerned with grouping. Not only, or not even chiefly, 

 has it had to do with the registration in memory of particular 

 percepts ; but much more has it had to do with the 

 spontaneous sorting of such percepts, with the spontaneous 

 arrangement of them in ideal (or imagery) systems, and, 

 consequent!)', with the spontaneous reflection in consciousness of 

 many among the less complex relations — or the less abstruse 

 principles — which have been uniformly encountered by the 

 mind in its converse with an orderly world. 



