158 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



divisions marked four and six in my representative scheme 

 (p. 88), and, as we have now so fully seen, is common to 

 animals and human beings. Indicative signs, then, whether 

 in the form of gestures, tones, or words, are intentionally 

 significant. For the most part they are expressive of 

 emotional states, and simple desires. When, for example, an 

 infant holds out its arms to be taken by the nurse, or points 

 to objects in order to be taken to them, it cannot be said to 

 be naming anything ; yet it is clearly indicating its wants. 

 Infants also cry intentionally, or as a partly conventional sign 

 to show discomfort, whether bodily or mental.* They will 

 likewise at an early age learn wholly conventional signs 

 whereby to indicate — though not yet to name— particular 

 feelings, objects, qualities, and actions. My son, for instance, 

 was taught by his nurse to shake his head for " No," nod it 

 for " Yes," and wave his hand for " Ta-ta," or leave-taking : 

 all these indicative gestures he performed well and appropri- 

 ately when eight and a half months old. This indicative 

 stage of language, or sign-making, is universally exhibited by 

 all the more intelligent animals, although not to so great an 

 extent as in infants. The parrot which depresses its head 

 to invite a scratching, the dog which begs before a wash- 

 stand, the cat which pulls one's clothes to solicit help for her 

 kittens in distress — all these animals are making what I call 

 indicative signs. 



Following upon the indicative stage of language there is 

 what I have called denotative (7 A in the scheme on p. 88). This 

 likewise occurs both in animals and in children when first 

 beginning to speak — talking birds, for instance, being able to 

 learn and correctly use names as notce, or marks, of particular 



• " The remark made by Tiedemann on the imperative intention of tears, is 

 confirmed by similar observations of Charles Darwin's. At the age of eleven 

 weeks, in the case of one of his children, a little sooner in another, the nature of 

 their crying changed according to whether it was produced by hunger or suffering. 

 And this means of communication appeared to be very early placed at the service 

 of the will. The child seemed to have learnt to cry when he wished, and to 

 contract his features according to the occasion, so as to make known that he 

 wanted something. This development of the will takes place towards the end of 

 the third month." (Perez, First Three Years of Childhood, English trans., p. loi.) 



