SPEECH. 187 



Now, if this is the case with regard to naming, clearly it must 

 also be the case with regard to judging : if there is a stage of 

 pre-conception, there must also be a stage of pre-judgment. 

 For we have seen that it is of the essence of a judgment that it 

 should be concerned with concepts : if the mind be concerned 

 merely with recepts, no act of true judgment can be said to 

 have been performed. When a child says Boiv-wow to the 

 picture of a dog, no one can maintain that he is actually 

 judging the resemblance of the picture to a dog, unless it be 

 supposed that for this act of receptual classification dis- 

 tinctively human powers of conceptual thought are required. 

 But, as just shown, no opponent of mine can afford to adopt 

 this supposition, because behind the case of the child there 

 stands that of the parrot. True, the parrot does not proceed 

 in its receptual classification further than to extend its name 

 for a particular dog to other living dogs ; but if any one were 

 foolish enough to stake his whole argument on so slender a 

 distinction as this — to maintain that at the place where the 

 connotation of a child first surpasses that of a parrot we have 

 evidence of a psychological distinction of kind, on the sole 

 ground that the child has begun to surpass the parrot — it would 

 be enough for me to remark that not every parrot will thus 

 extend its denotative sign from one dog to another of greatly 

 unlike appearance. Different birds display different degrees 

 of intelligence in this respect. Most of them will say Botu- 

 wozu, will bark, or utter any other denotative sign which they 

 may have learnt or invented, when they see dogs more or 

 less resembling the one to which the denotative sign was 

 originally applied ; but it is not every parrot which will thus 

 extend the sign from a terrier to a mastiff" or a Newfoundland. 

 Therefore, if any one were to maintain that the diff"ercnce 

 between the intelligence which can discern, and one which 

 cannot discern, the likeness of a dog in the image or the 

 picture of a dog, is a difference of kind, consistency should 

 lead him to draw a similar distinction between the intelligence 

 which can discern, and one which cannot discern, the likeness 

 of a terrier to a mastiff". But, if so, the intelhgence of one 



