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thus far confined myself to a mere designation of these great 

 and obvious distinctions. But seeing that even this preHmi- 

 nary step has necessitated a great deal of explanation, I feel 

 it may conduce to clearness if I end the present chapter with 

 a tabular statement of the sundry distinctions in question. 



By reccptiial judgments I will understand the same order 

 of ideation as Mr. Mivart expresses by his term " practical 

 inferences of brutes," instances of which have already becii 

 given in Chapter III. 



By pre-co)ucptual judgments I will understand those acts 

 of virtual or rudimentary judgment which are performed by 

 children subsequent to the " practical inferences " which they 

 share with brutes, but prior to the advent of self-conscious 

 reflection. These pre-conceptual judgments may be expressed 

 either by gestures, connotative classifications, or by both com- 

 bined. Some instances of them have already been given in 

 the present chapter : further and better instances will be given 

 in the chapters which are to follow. 



V)y conceptual judgments I will understand full and complete 

 judgments in the ordinary acceptation of this term. 



Receptual judgment, then, has to do with recepts ; pre-con- 

 ceptual judgment with pre-concepts ; and true judgments 

 with true concepts. Or, conversely stated, receptual know- 

 ledge leads to receptual judgment {e.g. when a sea-bird dives 

 into water but alights upon land) : pre-conceptual knowledge 

 leads to pre-conceptual judgment in the statement of such 

 knowledge {eg. when a child, by extending the name of a 

 dog to the picture of a dog, virtually affirms, though it does 

 not conceive, the resemblance which it perceives) : and, lastly, 

 conceptual knowledge leads to conceptual or veritable judg- 

 ment, in the statement of such knowledge known as knowledge 

 {eg. when, in virtue of his powers of reflective thought, a man 

 not only states a truth, but states that truth as true). 



Thus far I doubt whether my opponents will find it easy 

 to meet me. They may, of course, cavil at some or all of the 

 above distinctions ; but, if so, it is for them to show cause for 



