THE TRANSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL. 225 



moving in the rcceptual sphere of ideation, and that this 

 sphere is already (between one and two years) far above that 

 of the parrot. Yet, Hke the parrot, one of the first uses that 

 he makes of these signs is in the denotation of individual 

 objects, &c. Next, like the more intelligent parrots, he 

 extends the meaning of his denotative names to objects most 

 obviously resembling those which were first designated. And 

 from that point onwards he rapidly advances in his powers of 

 connotative classification. But can it be seriously main- 

 tained, in view of all the above considerations, that this rapid 

 advance in the powers of connotative classification betokens 

 any difference of kind between the ideation of the child and 

 that of the bird? If it is conceded (as it must be unless my 

 opponents commit argumentative suicide), that before he 

 could speak at all the infant was confined to the receptual 

 sphere of ideation, and that within this sphere his ideation 

 was already superior to the ideation of a bird, — this is merely 

 to concede that analogies must strike the child which are 

 somewhat too remote to strike the bird. Therefore, while the 

 bird will only extend its denotative name from one kind of 

 dog to another, the child, after having done this, will go on to 

 apply the name to an image, and, lastly, to the picture of a dog. 

 Surely no one will be fatuous enough to maintain that here, 

 at the commencement of articulate sign-making, there is any 

 evidence of generic distinction between the human mind and 

 the mind of even so poor a representative of animal psychology 

 as we meet with in a parrot. But, if no such distinction is to 

 be asserted here, neither can it be asserted anywhere else, 

 until we arrive at the stage of human ideation where the mind 

 is able to contemplate that ideation as such. So far, therefore, 

 as the stages which we are now considering are concerned {i.e. 

 the denotative and receptually connotative), I submit that my 

 case is made out. And yet these are really the most important 

 stages to be clear about ; for, on account of their having been 

 ignored by nearly all writers who argue that there is a differ- 

 ence of kind between man and brute, the most important — 

 because the initial— stages of transition have been lost sight of, 



