THE TRANSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL, 23 1 



Only if it could be shown — cither that the rcccptual ideation 

 of an infant differs in kind from that of an animal, or that 

 the pre-conceptual ideation of a child so differs from the 

 preceding rcccptual ideation of the same child, or lastly, that 

 this pre-conceptual ideation so differs from the succeeding 

 conceptual ideation — only if one or other of the alterna- 

 tives could be proved would my opponents be able to justify 

 their allegation. And, as a mere matter of logic, to prove 

 either of the last two alternatives would involve a com- 

 plete reconstruction of their argument. For at present their 

 argument goes upon the assumption that throughout all the 

 phases of its development a human mind is one in kind — 

 that it is nowhere fundamentally changed from one order of 

 existence to another. But in case any subtle opponent should 

 suggest that, although I have proved the first of the above 

 three alternatives untenable — and, therefore, that there is no 

 difference even of degree between the mind of an infant and 

 that of an animal, — I have nevertheless ignored the possibility 

 that in the subsequent development of every human being 

 a special miracle may be wrought, which regenerates that mind, 

 gives it a new origin, and so changes it as to kind — in case any 

 one should suggest this, I here entertain the two last alterna- 

 tives as logically possible. But, even so, as we have now so 

 fully seen, study of the child's intelligence while passing 

 through its several phases of development yields no shadow 

 of evidence in favour of any of these alternatives ; while, on 

 the contrary, it most clearly reveals the fact that transition 

 from each of the levels of ideation to the next above it is of 

 so gradual and continuous a character that it is practically 

 impossible to draw any real lines of demarcation between 

 them. This, then, I say is in itself enough to dispose of the 

 allegation of my opponents, seeing that it shows the allegation 

 to be, not only gratuitous, but opposed to the whole body of 

 evidence which is furnished by a study of the facts. Never- 

 theless, still restricting ourselves to grounds of psychology 

 alone, there remains two general and important considerations 

 of an independent or supplementary kind, which tend strongly 

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