THE \VIT.\ESS OF PHILOLOGY. 347 



somcthlrif^ morally indifferent." That is to say, they all 

 contain what I have termed a " reccptual core," expressive of 

 some simple physical process, or condition, the name of which 

 has been afterwards transferred, by " fundamental metaphor," 

 to the moral " concept." Omitting the illustrations, the passage 

 continues as follows : — " But why have not the morally good 

 and bad their own names in language t Why do we know 

 them from something else that previously had its appellation ? 

 Evidently because language dates from a period when a moral 

 judgment, a knowledge of good and evil, had not yet dawned 

 in the human mind." * 



Now, at present I am not concerned with this conclusion, 

 further than to remark that I do not see how it is to be 

 obviated, if our previous agreement is to stand with regard to 

 the precisely analogous case of the names of tools. That is 

 to say, if any one allows that the philological evidence is 

 sufficient to prove the priority of words to the tools which they 

 designate, consistency must constrain him also to allow that 

 the fundamental concepts of morality are of later origin than 

 the names by which they have been baptized, and in virtue 

 of which they must be regarded as having become concepts 

 at all. These names — just like the names of tools — were all 

 originally of nothing more than pre-conceptual significance, 

 serving to denote such obvious physical states or activities as 

 were immediately cognizable by the powers of sensuous per- 

 ception and direct association. Then, as the moral sense 

 began to dawn, and the utilitarian significance of conduct as 

 ethical began to be appreciated, the principles of" fundamental 

 metaphor" were applied to the naming of these newly found 

 concepts — presumably at about the same time as these same 

 principles were applied to the naming of newly found tools. 



Now, this is only one illustration out of a practically infinite 

 number of others which it would be easy to quote — seeing, 

 indeed, as Whitney observes, that " we can hardly write a 

 line without giving illustrations of this kind of linguistic 

 growth." And whatever may be thought (at this premature 



• Gcigcr, // Lecture to the Commercial Club of Frankfort onthe-Matn (1869). 



