10 The Morality of Nature 



is not to be called bad. The bad results are incidental, aod 

 although they may overcome the value of the good, it is 

 manifestly a deficiency of good which characterises the con- 

 duct. It is not evil conduct of an opposite and irreconcil- 

 able quality, but good conduct of insufficient power. 



Bad or evil conduct is, broadly speaking, the willful 

 doing of things injurious to others or to oneself. But 

 it is seldom indeed that evil is done for its own sake, even 

 by those condemned as bad. There is always some object 

 sought, which might, under some circumstances be per- 

 missible ; such as personal benefit or gratification, but which 

 is attained now by a course involving injury to others or to 

 oneself out of proportion to the benefit achieved. 



It is easily seen that an early advantage, gained by con- 

 duct which entails later harmful consequences, is not to 

 be described as good, unless the benefit is greater than the 

 injury, and of course it is quickly perceived that a good 

 action may be at first involved with deprivation or injury, 

 which in the end will more than repay the loss, in its advan- 

 tages. 



The desire to conceive and carry out action, with a true 

 estimate of its effects, so as to achieve a result primarily 

 desired, is the active guiding force in conduct, and the 

 need of regulating the conception and governing the action 

 justly, so that undesirable effects shall not occur is the 

 restraining force, and of this couple of forces a resultant 

 is sought, which shall take into consideration both ; not only 

 viewing the immediate act and the first results, but beyond 

 these, shall consider the long chain of consequences which 

 will or may follow. 



