Responsibility in Relation to Nature 17 



determines how much he receives and how long his par- 

 ticipation continues. It is evident that this responsibihty 

 governs not only mankind, but all living things from the 

 beginning of volition, and even earlier. There is a liabil- 

 ity to harmful occurrences in those most primitive lives 

 which have no will or intelligence and to which all events are 

 as accidents. The simple protozoon happening to be where 

 natural surroundings become unfavorable, and having no 

 alternative, dies or languishes while another similar crea- 

 ture nearby lives in prosperity. Without choice the latter 

 receives the beneficial consequences of his position although 

 not apparently merited as a result of action; and the other 

 dies, as if suffering a penalty for being in a place of 

 danger. Here although obviously no responsibility can 

 accrue in the moral sense later implied by the word, yet 

 relentless nature distributes life and death according to 

 facts which make it appear to be by hazard. 



So too when a somewhat higher phase of life is in ques- 

 tion, and a primitive animal with some power of locomo- 

 tion seeks to escape a danger, yet fails; it seems to pay a 

 penalty for lack of speed, and however high in the scale 

 of life an organized creature may stand, it is liable to this 

 same destruction by catastrophe. Therein is seen that the 

 responsibility which begins with volition carries along 

 with it, the same primitive liability to destruction. It is only 

 lessened in degree because of the privilege of the dawning 

 will and power to move. This power lessens the danger 

 only a little, yet appreciably, and makes the creature more 

 fit to contend with its difficulties, and those more fit sur- 

 vive and those less fit are destroyed. This survival is the 



