20 The Morality of Nature 



fails to secure himself. So somewhere between the two 

 possible extremes, of his fullest preeminence, and his utter 

 extermination ; he stands in a place which is the consequence 

 of his free will and actions, of the sum of all the conse- 

 quences, of all his thoughts and deeds. This sum includes 

 motive only as part of the process of action. It is obviously 

 by results that conduct entails consequence. 



These are simple facts clearly seen in nature and easily 

 expressed. From them may be deduced that at least in some 

 phases and cases conduct tends, even if it does not always 

 appear, to bring to pass its own compensation — in beneficial 

 results for good conduct and evil results for bad conduct. 

 The imperfect appearance at times of the truth of this rule 

 is due to a prevalence in many cases of confusing things 

 which do not really contradict it, but which are of un- 

 known values. 



This obscurity is, however, of very great effect when 

 the conduct of highly organized creatures is considered. 

 And especially it is so when the complex activity of hu- 

 manity is concerned in the social units of many individuals. 



Then there are impulses and actions so much involved 

 one with another that occurrences cannot be readily traced, 

 as effects of particular causes, and conduct cannot be 

 charged clearly with its proper results. It may then seem 

 that actions which should be considered bad according to 

 simpler experience, do in practice result beneficially to the 

 actor; and actions presumably good may appear to bring 

 injury. And in this apparent failure of the law previously 

 accepted, there is produced a doubt and sometimes even an 

 entire disbelief, of its effectiveness; so that a well inten- 



