22 The Morality of Nature 



activity and in consequences, many contradictions appear. 

 Some are real, and show opposing forces ; some are matters 

 of expression rather than of fact. For example, an act 

 done by one on behalf of another person may be said to in- 

 volve that other in the responsibility, and so to contradict the 

 theory of individual liability. Yet analysis shows that two 

 actions are then involved, first the original deed, which is 

 the act of the doer, although offered to the use of another; 

 and second, its rejection or acceptance by the other, which 

 is a separate act. The two individuals are thus responsible, 

 not jointly for one deed, but separately for two distinct 

 things. Every action which is applied toward a fellow 

 being, will thus involve him in a related act of conduct, but 

 not in the same kind of responsibility. 



And so too when more than one individual is involved 

 in the joint perpetration of a deed, even if it is directed to- 

 wards inanimate nature for its object, there is finally a 

 fraction or an influence separately attributable to any one 

 of them, even if it is not capable of abstraction in words and 

 speech. It is clear that in nature where effects follow 

 causes; the thing that the individual actually does, is in 

 question as an operating cause. The deed counts, although 

 it may not have been intended, and although it may not be 

 itself discernible; and although it may be revealed only 

 imperfectly in the consequences at a later time. It must be 

 admitted as part of the proposition of liability that the true 

 extent and value of an action cannot always be susceptible 

 of expression, nay more, may not be discoverable now or at 

 any time, yet it may become clear that the action does pro- 

 duce its consequences, and that they balance the real account 



