28 The Morality of Nature 



must have separate self -care, each one watching his own 

 risks and taking his own precautions. The preservation of 

 harmony has not removed the threats of a hostile environ- 

 ment, each still faces danger, with the power and need for 

 exertion so that he may survive separately, or by his partici- 

 pation in collective activity. In short he is responsible for 

 the consequences of his acts, and in the count of those con- 

 sequences there must be included the actions toward him 

 of his associates. The self -regarding motive of this con- 

 duct is not inconsistent with, and does not make it repugnant 

 to, those higher principles which moral ethics develop. They 

 are engrafted upon it to further it, not to overcome it. In 

 the conception of the duties of a mortal individual self there 

 is a confusion of ideas which will clear up only upon careful 

 analysis. Primitive conduct shows in its earliest forms a 

 type of self-love which is free from any stigma. There is 

 no other motive, until associated life confers benefits which 

 create a duty towards others. Then and not until then can 

 selfishness appear as an immoral or wrong motive. As it 

 thus begins, and as it continues in higher conduct, selfishness 

 is the disregard of the debt and obligation to others, which 

 exists simultaneously with the primitive duty to self. But 

 this primitive duty to self does not disappear then or at any 

 later time. It persists as the prime motive of life. It is 

 not selfish. It gives full due regard to others and only a 

 due regard to self, while selfishness has undue regard for 

 self. There is no clearly recognized word in the language 

 for this motive, and the lack is one of the causes of mis- 

 understanding. The word self-love makes the proper dis- 

 tinction from "selfish," of conduct seen in the light of the 



