34 The Morality of Nature 



To form a conception of the individual nature of the 

 conduct of several creatures, a separation of an act into 

 parts may be imagined. For example, the recipient of an 

 assistance rendered by another, acts himself in accepting the 

 help, and in the manner of acceptance and in the degree of 

 wisdom in it. If one person acting for himself gives alms 

 and stands accountable for so doing, the other person, he 

 who received them, has acted too for himself and with 

 entirely different responsibility. He may have begged with 

 falsehood or with cowardice, or. on the other hand, he may 

 have only, by misfortune, lost his independence, and may 

 have been honest and reluctant in taking aid. These are 

 matters of his conduct, and for them the giver is not 

 answerable. 



A^ain in the case of what mav be called controlled con- 

 duct, a man may be nearly powerless to choose his course, 

 by reason of his subjection to forces administered by others, 

 and vet he mav be responsible for his previous actions, by 

 which he allowed himself to become thus subject to control. 

 If a man is compelled by his association with others to com- 

 mit an act commonly considered criminal, when he knows 

 better, and is disinclined, he may possibly be in part ab- 

 solved of that act, but clearly he might still be chargeable 

 with error in having joined that association. The impelling 

 influences of others will often make them the apparent 

 authors of a controlled action which is to be considered as 

 at least partially chargeable to the individual because of his 

 lack of independence. In such cases the control is really 

 only a certain portion of that surrounding universe, the 

 hostile environment against which the individual must con- 



