Individuality 35 



tend; his failure to meet its attacks being his own risk. 

 If a man yield to the temptations of vicious company and 

 indulge in excesses to the neglect of useful work, it is 

 apparent that he will bear in his body the consequent loss 

 of health and fortune just as if he had chosen the conduct. 

 His case in yielding to the temptation is not materially 

 different from that of another man who is tempted to 

 indolence by inanimate nature, by luxurious sunshine and an 

 enervating climate. It is at his own risk that he encounters 

 these inducements — they are outside of him and around 

 him and whether of human origin or otherwise, his conduct 

 when he meets them is his own affair, although a share of 

 the responsibility for developing such conditions may rest 

 upon others. 



Similarly if one man commit a direct crime against an- 

 other, robbery for example, we have in regard to the robber 

 a thing done by him for which he is responsible for himself, 

 not, be it observed, solely to his victim, but, through the 

 laws of nature, to all nature and to himself. It is his 

 responsibility, his deed, and he is answerable for it and 

 for the consequences. The man robbed unites with his 

 peace loving neighbors and collectively they assail the rob- 

 ber and destroy him. But immediate consequences fall upon 

 the victim who is robbed. Here is a distinction less easy 

 to define. The victim, has, in the operation of non-psycho- 

 logical nature, no remedy against the other, however just 

 his claim may be under moral or human laws. He is him- 

 self answerable for the way in which he wards off all such 

 antagonisms, and secures compensation. This robber is one 

 of the adversities to be fought just as are disease and storm. 



