Individuality 37 



individual concerned. To the doer only, or a participant, 

 it involves responsibility as a prime act. To any other of 

 the objects of the deed it is one of the incidents of the out- 

 side world, of his environment, and to any such, the ques- 

 tion of conduct develops, not on the lines of the deed, but 

 on the lines of his attitude toward it. 



In this is seen that natural responsibility involves no 

 scheme of restitution until higher phases of morality appear. 

 Responsibility as the thing is meant here is with the doer, 

 the consequences which fall upon others may be resented by 

 them, and by a new activity may be brought back upon the 

 original doer, by action and conduct of the victims, not in 

 an undoing of the first act — that is impossible — but in an 

 execution of secondary acts to compensate those whose 

 interests were affected, or whose impulses were provoked. 

 It is incumbent upon him who is injured to find allies and 

 organize with them for the remedying of the injury. 



Assuming then the expediency of calling all the effects 

 of conduct consequences, there arises the need of separately 

 classifying those effects which are to be considered as repre- 

 senting the interests of humanity and of nature at large as 

 opposed to the individual. These effects may be called 

 compensations. The results of selfish volition, it has been 

 seen, often involve others in their consequences. And the 

 securing of compensations by those affected are to be re- 

 garded as secondary effects of the original conduct which 

 react upon the doer to his disadvantage and regulate the 

 conduct and give origin and effect to law. 



The man who has been robbed unites with his peaceloving 

 neighbors and they agree to aid each other in securing their 



