68 The Morality of Nature 



still they are important in principle. There is found a 

 power for self-preservation reposing in the aggregation 

 which does not exist in any individual. The abnormal 

 creature which deserts the association does so at his peril; 

 he may die; in fact it can be seen that many do so die; a 

 shoal of a thousand little fish is reduced to a hundred before 

 they complete their first year. 



But when the habit is established we have noted that all 

 depend upon it, and by desertion a creature not only doe;s 

 ill for himself; he deprives the association of parti of its 

 strength. A variation of conduct appears involving a ques- 

 tion of right and wrong in an act formerly free from that 

 question. First independent action appears to be wrong 

 upon the simple test of profitableness. And in considera- 

 tion of the fact that the privileges of the association were 

 inherited side by side with liability for services to mutual 

 support, it again appears to be wrong in a moral sense. 

 Here then arises the primitive phase of a new conduct 

 called duty, a variation in conduct not arising by chance, 

 but as a logical consequence of previous activity. It takes 

 its place however provisionally. The question under trial 

 is the value to the individual, of a certain support or assist- 

 ance by others of his kind, which is afforded in mutual 

 relations requiring from him a return support of the 

 aggregation, by his contribution in services. Now the 

 answer to this trial is usually in favor of this variation. 

 In nature the creatures achieving this conduct generally 

 survive by it, and consideration of the greater unit becomes 

 more necessary; and thenceforth the habit is maintained and 

 cultivated, and the earlier death of all who violate it tends 



