1 84 The Morality of Nature 



fit« which secures his co-operation and assistance in the work ; 

 and in his turn he contributes a share of his advantages, as 

 the price for tolerance and help. It being of course perceived 

 that such sharing is not direct and stipulated, but is indirect 

 and voluntary, and expressed in the confidence and faith of 

 the participant, as much as in the deeds of the community. 

 Altruism ofifers benefit without previous stipulation of price. 

 Even the idealized altruism, which is the abstract of such 

 conduct, presented by specialized ability or authority, can 

 be perceived to reach its highest expression in those deeds 

 which one does for another because that other, while desiring 

 them, is unable to do them for himself. The need of the 

 needy makes an action altruistic, which would without it be 

 dictatorial; and the comparatively high ability of the doer 

 makes conservative and economical, what would without it 

 be wasteful. It remains possible that unselfish sacrifice, even 

 if undesired, may be admirable; and it is possible that efforts 

 for others, even when wasteful of work in proportion to 

 results, may yet be of virtue. But such examples do not 

 show the true high worth of altruism. If no valuable 

 results at all appeared these efforts would still have a right 

 to respect as the product of a virtue which is instinctive 

 and necessarily unreasoning, and therefore, even in error, 

 lovable. But it is in the showing of a net and final balance 

 of benefit over expenditure that conduct proves itself good, 

 and it is in this respect that altruism inspires man with the 

 instinct and capacity for association. The end is sought at 

 times by individual action, for benefit in which all shall 

 share; and at others, by collective work, for benefits which 

 each in turn shall enjoy according to need; but in either case 



