210 The Morality of Nature 



may even arise that, as between two courses of nearly equal 

 value, one is right on one place, simply because of some 

 convention to which men make concessions in mutual respect. 

 So it occurs that nations of equal cultivation may properly 

 differ as to details of conduct; and if equals so differ, it is 

 clear that those unequal must present points of greater dif- 

 ference; and these differences operate to limit the proper 

 scope of any human laws which have been evolved under 

 limited conditions. But although we detect the absence 

 and impossibility of unity, we may still trace much similarity 

 of purpose and much community of ideals and some uni- 

 formity of expression. There are cardinal virtues common 

 to all the great codes which are generally promoted to a 

 nearly undisputed permanence. Such for example are the 

 ideals supporting truth, justice, duty, faithfulness, pity, 

 respect for life, philanthropy and liberty; and love, which 

 includes all these and more. Yet even these cannot be im- 

 posed upon inferior people in the same form accepted by the 

 superior race or condition of men. The attempts in com- 

 pulsory elevation to morality have failed in regard to these 

 highest virtues as well as in lesser ones. And on the other 

 hand the most successful extensions of higher civilization 

 into lower, has been done in a tolerance of imperfection in 

 the degree of culture; and insistence chiefly upon the aim 

 and direction of the development, a practice of tolerance to 

 teach tolerance. 



It is also clear that right conduct, as perceived by wisdom, 

 can be imposed upon ignorance only in the negative function 

 of restraining what is wrong; which is in fact the exercise 

 of the common collective right to oppose injurious activities ; 



