220 The Morality of Nature 



forms differing according to the customs then and there 

 prevalent. Therefore, when any complexities of form, which 

 may have been allowed to accrue under a system of semi- 

 predatory civilization, are becoming obsolete, and are yield- 

 ing to higher ideals of altruistic co-operation, we see a gen- 

 eral reference back to these first principles, sometimes in 

 search of a merely convenient organization, and sometimes 

 as revealing the true understanding of the moral source of 

 authority, upon which those with claims to independence, 

 may dispute with older control. 



The consent of the governed to any operation of govern- 

 ment is asserted to be not only a matter of policy, which 

 may be exercised for the attainment of wise action, accord- 

 ing to the will or power of the people or the governor, but 

 it is claimed to be a necessary foundation for any right act 

 of governmental control, because the righteous source of 

 all such authority is in the desires of the people themselves, 

 not as a mere privilege, but as the essence of rightness. In 

 this view, what a social aggregate desires, is right because 

 the aggregate has the only intelligence, and the only in- 

 stinct, physically qualified to prescribe its conduct according 

 to its inherited capacity and structure. The opposition to 

 this claim naturally comes chiefly from those established in 

 authority by ancient usage; and in different places it rests 

 in different titles. Some of these are based upon a former 

 acceptance or choice of leaders by the people. Such title is 

 practically of the same type and principle as the radical one, 

 unless it be so old as to be obsolete. But those titles which 

 really raise the issue in full force seek to establish for some 

 superior wisdom, a right to impose its conduct upon others 



