194 BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY [BuU. 188 



implied threat of credit forfeiture is almost entirely effective. The 

 policy of credit saturation thus in itself tends to make credit risks 

 safer. In a normal year and with competent management Shonto's 

 credit losses will average between 1 and 2 percent, which is consider- 

 ably less than the average credit loss reported to the writer by a 

 group of Tucson retail merchants. 



Most traders are convinced that the threat of credit stoppage will 

 continue to carry weight only if it is carried into action promptly 

 and assiduously in any and all cases of default. Because of their 

 presumed example value Shonto Trading Post never discounts de- 

 linquent accounts or countenances any manner of compromise, even 

 though a small amount of revenue is probably lost thereby. If credit 

 is stopped absolutely the defaulting household is in most cases quickly 

 forced to bend all its resources toward getting the debt paid off 

 so as to draw more credit. Sometimes a related household in the 

 same residence group will come forward to settle the account. At 

 other times one or more members must immediately go off to work 

 to raise the money (cf. Collier and Collier, 1953, p. 220). If an 

 honest effort is made to settle the account, and if it succeeds, the 

 defaulter is duly rehabilitated with an admonition to use better judg- 

 ment. 



A few other extra-legal sanctions assist the trader in collecting 

 book accounts. Recipients of public assistance are reminded in one 

 way or another that their grants are for groceries and other neces- 

 sities which are sold at the trading post; and that if they do not 

 spend all of their money as intended the amount of their grant 

 will be reduced. If local payroll accounts show signs of delinquency 

 the trader can and does appeal to the '\Vliite employers to help him 

 out by having a talk with the individuals involved. Shonto's school- 

 teachers have been especially cooperative in this regard on a couple 

 of occasions, with the result that the Navaho employees of the school 

 believe that they will lose their jobs if they do not pay their store 

 bills. This belief is ideal from the traders point of view, although 

 it has no basis in fact. 



One of the most powerful sanctions which the trader can bring 

 against many of Shonto's Navahos is the threatened or actual re- 

 fusal to perform for them the myriad extra-commercial functions 

 for which they normally depend on him, such as writing and read- 

 ing letters, securing employment, interceding with the law, and 

 the like (see pp. 214-231). Finally, he may threaten to retaliate 

 upon relatives by cutting off the credit of related households and even 

 holding them responsible for the delinquent account. In nearly all 

 cases the latter will deny any responsibility. Such an act of repudia- 

 tion, however, threatens the security of the defaulting household as 



