26 BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY [Bull. 197 



fundamental limitation to their effectiveness was the indifference of 

 the higher authorities in Washington to their needs. For example, 

 the terms of the Peace Treaty in 1861 stipulated that every Navaho 

 family head who agreed to establish a farm on the reservation would 

 receive a supply of agricultural implements and seeds for a specified 

 period following the establishment of his farm. Actually, the first 

 shipment of hoes and axes did not arrive at Fort Defiance until 1882, 

 a delay of 13 years ! ^* Confronted with endless delays and misunder- 

 standings, lacking facilities of any kind, most of the agents of this 

 period confined themselves to the preparation of periodic reports on 

 the condition of the Indians under their jurisdiction, and drafting 

 pleas for greater material assistance. Their reports were duly filed 

 and their j)leas ignored or shelved. These agents were therefore 

 unable to undertake any sustained ameliorative programs on the reser- 

 vation at this time.^^ 



Despite the weakness of the Indian administration during this 

 period, the Navaho gave ample evidence of significant progress by 

 the end of the 19th century. They had attained a degree of economic 

 self-sufficiency and even wealth which would scarcely have seemed 

 possible immediately following Fort Sumner. In less than 30 years, 

 they increased their livestock holdings from no more than 40,000 

 sheep and goats in 1870 to nearly 20 times that number, plus many 

 thousands of horses.*^ Furthermore, significant beginnings were 

 finally being made in the formal education of Navaho children, after 

 the repeated failures of the 1870's and 1880's. This general develop- 

 ment was reflected in the growth of the population itself, which had 

 at least doubled in the generation following the exile to Fort Sumner. 



It was only natural that most Navahos, and many Wliite observers 

 as well, regarded this impressive growth as proof of even greater pros- 

 perity to come. Actually, the flocks and herds of the Navaho were 

 rapidly growing beyond the carrying capacity of their lands. By 

 1899, it was estimated that as many as half the Navahos were forced 



•>i Underhill, 1953, p. 226. The shipment that finally did arrive in 18S2 was both 

 unique and inadequate. 



*^ One notes the presence of an underlying moral dilemma here. The status of the 

 Indian as a ward of the State was clearly anomalous in a society stressing individual 

 initiative and self-reliance. At the same time, Christian ethics decreed a certain moral 

 responsibility toward the Indian on the part of the society that had destroyed his former 

 way of life. This dilemma is still in evidence in current debates concerning the issue 

 of accommodation of Indian tribes as viable entitles within the larger society versus 

 assimilation of individual Indians iuto the mainstream of American life. See, for example, 

 La Farge, 1957, and Watkins, 1957. 



*^ The records are unclear as to the livestock holdings of the Navaho immediately fol- 

 lowing their captivity at Fort Sumner. Dunn (1958, p. 403) summarizes their holdings 

 in 1867 as reduced to 550 horses, 20 mules, 940 sheep, and 1,025 goats, held by about 

 7,300 Indians. Underhill (1956, p. 155) states that the Navaho retained about 2,000 

 sheep and goats upon their return from the fort. Both Underhill (1956, p. 155) and 

 Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn and Leighton, 1951, p. 33) mention an issue of 14,000 sheep and 

 1,000 goats in 1869, but Hodge (1910, p. 42) referred to a total Government issue of 

 some 30,000 stock at this time. 



