11 



Pragmatically, it strikes us that the more productive approach would he in 

 limited stages, closely associated with practical problems as they occur, and the 

 gradual working out of problems of cooperation within a framework of inter- 

 nationally binding law. 



During the period in which modern international law evolved, the bed of the 

 sea and its subsoil were technologically inaccessible. As a result, no specific doctrine 

 was developed as to ownership and exploitation of submerged areas. Whether 

 the exercise of sovereignty over the territorial seas and contiguous zones included 

 a like or lesser control of the subsoil and seabed was not a matter of practical or 

 legal importance. 



Unilateral action regarding sponges and pearls — in areas called fisheries — 

 represented the initial attempt to control areas of seabed. In English jurisprudence, 

 the isolated incidents of litigation and subsoil rights were brought by the Crown 

 as a result of the extension of mine shafts beneath territorial seas. 



Nonetheless, two general principles have evolved which could be applied. One 

 is the Roman doctrine of res communis, or common to all. This has provided the 

 basis for the generally accepted doctrine of freedom of the seas. Institutions of 

 this doctrine would prevent any establishment of national sovereignty. The second 

 doctrine is that of res nuUius, or belonging to none. Such a doctrine would permit 

 the acquisition and extension of sovereignty into such areas as were not already 

 occupied. The two doctrines, of course, are incompatible. 



It has been only recently, when modern technology has made it feasible and 

 profitable to drill oil wells into the subsoil, and when projections of future in- 

 terrelated demands for energy, water, and minerals from the sea have been es- 

 tablished, that the importance of ownership of the seabed and subsoil has become 

 fully recognized. 



In 1945, President Harry Truman issued a landmark proclamation in which 

 he expressed the view that — 



"The exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed 

 of the Continental Shelf by the contiguous Nation is reasonable and just." 



And proclaimed further: 



"The Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the sub- 

 soil and seabed of the Continental Shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the 

 coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States (and) subject to 

 its jurisdiction and control." 



This, however, could be explained as a domestic matter in the historic sense. 

 Soon, however, in light of the new technological capabilities, it became neces- 

 sary to extend the width of territorial waters and to establish contiguous zones, 

 formerly regarded as high seas areas. 



As a result, the Convention on the Continental Shelf attempted to establish 

 a method for national control over the seabed and subsoil of the Continental 

 Shelf, so that sovereignty over the superjacent waters would not be extended. 

 Unfortunately, the Convention adopted a double standard for establishing the 

 limits within which the coastal state may exercise "sovereign rights for the pur- 

 pose of exploring and exploiting" the Continental Shelf. The first article of the 

 Convention provides that — 



"The term 'continental shelf is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil 

 of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial 

 sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 

 superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 

 areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the 

 coasts of islands." 



And the second article then declares that — 



"1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for 

 the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 



"2. The rights referred to in paragraph one of this article are exclusive in the 

 sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit it 

 natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the 

 continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State. 



"3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on 

 occupation, effective or national or on any express proclamation." 



The implications of this doctrine present numerous problems in international 

 law of the sea. What remains unclear is the outer boundary of this exclusive area. 

 What if the seabed has deep trenches in it? Does the coastal jurisdiction revive 

 farther at sea? Under part (a) of article I, cannot one state just keep going, o>it 

 into the sea up to the point where another state makes a similar claim? And then, 



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