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where are we left? Furthermore, what about the area beyond the coastal state's 

 jurisdiction, what regime rules here? Does res nullius or res communis apply? It 

 would seem that m reality, the only limit is that which is measured by the criterion 

 of exploitability. 



There is a growing concern that somewhere in the near future a few oceano- 

 graphic powers will be able to occupy and thus appropriate all the deep ocean 

 mineral areas that could be developed for some time. 



Recently, President Johnson called attention to these dangers in his remarks at 

 the commissioning of the new research ship Oceanographer: 



"Under no circumstances, must we ever allow the prospect of rich harvest and 

 mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime 

 nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands under 

 the high seas. We must ensure that the deep and the ocean bottoms are, and re- 

 main, the legacy of all human beings." 



Clearly, we are now faced with some fundamental decisions about rights and uses 

 of the lands beneath the sea. Pressures for making the decisions are mounting daily. 



In a paper prepared for the American Bar Association National Institute on 

 Maritime Resources, Mr. Frances T. Christ}^, Jr., outlined the criteria for the 

 establishment of a useful regime over the sea. In part, he stated: 



"In considering the alternative regimes, the basic objective is to arrive at that 

 regime that will be viable over the long-run and that will encourage the economi- 

 cally efficient, peaceful, and orderly exploitation of the minerals of the sea floor, 

 its success will be measured against three criteria. First, it must permit economi- 

 cally efficient operation. Second it must be acceptable to a sufficient number of 

 nalicrs lolh in the long and the short run. And third, it must be feasible." 



In the United States, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in its 

 17th report, dated May 1966, ]:)resented its arguments for the proposal that — 



"With respect to the bed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf and to 

 outer space, which are outside the jurisdiction of any state, we urge the General 

 Assembly to declare the title of the international communitj^ and to establish 

 appropriate administrative arrangements." 



With the United Nations owning and licensing for exploitation the sea floor 

 minerals, the income would naturally flow into the U.N. 



And, on February 15, 1967, Senator Frank Church proposed that — 



"By conferring title on the United Nations to mineral resources on the ocean 

 floor beyond the Continental Shelf, under an international agreement regulating 

 their development, we might not only remove a coming cause of international 

 friction, but also endow the United Nations with a source for substantial revenue 

 in the future." 



On the surface, we suppose, this may seem to be a most logical, necessary, and 

 simple proposition. But a more than cursory look at the implications of such a 

 move would reveal some of the numerous problems which arise. 



The U.N. would have to acquire jurisdiction over resources on and under the 

 sea floor in order to permit it to grant and protect exclusive rights of entrepreneur- 

 ship and to withhold areas from exploration and development perhaps for the 

 use of missile ranges and such. Would allocations be made to nations or to indi- 

 vidual developers? In addition it would have to have the power to tax or extract 

 rent or royalty payments for the use of the resources. It would also have to be 

 granted the ability to utilize or distribute these revenues in an acceptable manner 

 and boundaries for its own jurisdiction would have to be established. Probably 

 some scheme would have to be enforced whereby the interest of the adjacent 

 coastal states would be recognized and perhaps they would split royalties with 

 the U.N. Some equitable method for doing so would have to be found. Perhaps 

 the closer the exploitation to the shore of the state, the greater its share of the 

 royalties. Some form of a bidding mechanism would be necessary to insure efficient 

 and fair allocation of the rights of exploitability. 



Many other controls would have to be established. Definite time limits for 

 performance of the required exploration and exploitation would be necessary, as 

 would some form of inspection to insure that the requirements of the lease were 

 being upheld, that maximum care was being taken to insure that the marine 

 environment was not being damaged, and that the resources were being used 

 efficiently. 



Administratively, the placing of jurisdiction over the sea in the hands of a 

 group such as the United Nations poses numerous other problems. Initially, we 

 must ask, where a qualified staff would be found. How could they determine the 

 size of a possible lease, the duration or terms of renewal, the royalties or taxes 



