13 



which should be applied, the method of awarding concessions to competing groups, 

 the amount and nature of control of production and prices, and effectively estab- 

 lish and enforce the controls and requirements previously enumerated as well as 

 those yet unnamed, except on an extremely arbitrary basis? With a questionable 

 degree of urgency, should we not be sure that we are on solid ground before 

 committing ourselves to a position we might later regret? 



It has been pointed out that a great deal of money is required for deep sea 

 mineral exploration, but even more will be necessary for production. Only a few 

 very large companies, and a few national governments have the necessary risk 

 capital readily available. Of the 135 national states in the world, 109 border on 

 the sea, but the governments likely to be involved in undersea operations of this 

 nature number no more than a dozen if we take into consideration the factors of 

 financial capacity, maritime experience and undersea technology. But, these are 

 the very same nations with important military and strategic interests in the 

 sea. In the past they have not found it necessary or expedient to ask permission 

 from the United Nations to carrjr out their undersea operations. In the future, 

 it is doubtful that they are going to find it necessary or desirable to ask the U.N. 

 for permission to carry out their mineral explorations. 



Furthermore, these are the very same nations which have veto powers in the 

 Security Council and extraordinary bargaining powers in the General Assembly. 



Then again, it is rather inconceivable that nations large or small would con- 

 cede taxes and royalty rights, previously under their own jurisdiction to a non- 

 sovereign agency for the granting of a right which it only obtained power to 

 grant because these nations elected to create such a device. The United Nations' 

 primary function is that of a mediator, not a sovereign. Nor would many nations 

 be ready to accept a proposal which would permit emplacement of foreign con- 

 trolled structures near their coasts. Many coastal nations would undoubtedly 

 have to yield rights previously asserted. The United States, for example, has 

 granted a phosphate lease some 40 miles from the coast of California in 240 to 

 4,000 feet of w^ater. 



Furthermore, even despite inspection controls, many states would naturally be 

 apprehensive about positioning structures, under foreign control, near their 

 shores, because of potential interference with navigation, fishing, recreation, sub- 

 marine pipelines and cables, and military exercises. Such structures would be 

 potential bases for covert espionage and military purposes, as well as potential 

 producers of pollutants which would eventually reach the adjacent shores. 



We readily doubt that we are at an appropriate stage in ocean development for 

 the establishment of detailed rules and principles for allocating and regulating the 

 use of the ocean. Our view of the future is rather dimly perceived. There are an 

 infinite number of varied possibilities in the field of adapting the ocean to humapt 

 benefit. While we can hope to prepare for dealing with a variety of possibilities, 

 and attempt to make extremely flexible, tentative, resolutions for anticipated 

 problems, we cannot be nearly as optimistic if we seek to definitively resolve 

 problems now which are hard to define except in the most general of terms. Can we 

 effectively formulate rules for the exploration and exploitation of resources before 

 we know what and where these resources are? Thus allocation of sovereignty to an 

 international community should be considered a bit premature at this time. 



Our present knowledge of the future of drilling and production technology is 

 similarly limited. We really have very little knowledge of what the state of such 

 machinery, and the problems they could conceivably present in the near future are 

 or what their course of development would be. Due to this unpredictable tech- 

 nological timetable and in the name of efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary 

 restraints on efficient equipment should we not wait until we are more familiar 

 with technology before adopting treaty principles? 



As far as the need for providing a source of income for the United Nations is 

 concerned, a number of points should be made. If the world powers, whose assent 

 would be a prerequisite to a plan to turn the ocean floor over to the U.N., desired 

 to support that organization wholeheartedly, they certainly could do so without 

 resorting to the sea at this stage in time. Certainly a restructuring of the General 

 Assembly would be a necessary requirement before the major powers would agree 

 to permit it to dispose of large amounts of money obtained independent of their 

 control, but in reality, at their expense. Current political realities make this a 

 necessity. 



Certainly, the U.N. presently has enough administrative problems with which 

 to deal. It can ill afford additional burdens at this point. It has recently become 

 all too evident that the U.N. has a long way to go in its maturation process. 



