20 



would limit the capacity of the United Nations to say to the United 

 States or to Great Britain or to Japan that they could exploit under a 

 license or to give a license to some private concern. 



In other words, is it really a limitation on the possibility of exploita- 

 tion that the original grant of authority should stem from some kind 

 of international body rather than from some national body? In any 

 event it finally comes down to men and machines, and so on. It may 

 be under private control, it may be under some kind of quasi-govern- 

 mental control, under national control, or conceivably it could be 

 contracted for directly by an international body. 



I raise this only in a discussion sense. I don't take a definitive 

 position. 



I will add a final comment here and this would end my question. 



When I was at the U.N. last week I had the impression that the 

 introduction by Malta of this request was seen in the U.N. as the 

 beginning of a very long process of precisely the kind you are describing. 

 In other words, this is the first step in a 1,000-mile journey. It was not 

 thought there was about to be a vote to finally dispose of the ocean 

 beds in the world but this was the beginning of opening the subject to 

 these very kinds of discussions which you properly described. These 

 things are very important and should be worked out. 



Mr. Hanna. Let me see whether I can make some kind of comment 

 at least in answer to what I think you asked. First of all, would you 

 replirase the first part of your thinking as a question so I can be sure I 

 am addressing myself to it? 



Mr. Fraser. The two questions are these: Does exploitation have 

 to come under national supervision? Does that have to be a source of 

 authority or the source of license? The other question was, what about 

 the problem if you wait too long, so there is an assertion of national 

 interest throughout the world so that you might then put it beyond 

 the reach of an international body? 



Mr. Hanna. I think this is the kind of thing that occurs many times 

 in decisionmaking in a legislative body. There are buy-offs in whatever 

 kind of decision you make. It is a mistake to believe that you have to 

 do one thing or else the other. 



I often think of an old Irish friend of mine, Mickey !Moltehill. He 

 came in one day muttering from the roundhouse. 



I said: "What is the trouble, Mike?" He said, "It is the blather- 

 skite at the roundhouse. He is always giving me a bad time. He says 

 to me today: 'Mike, you either do this or else.' 



He says, "You know what I told him. I'll take 'else'. She's not such 

 a bad old girl." 



It seems to me whenever you present somebody with either do this 

 or else, they are likely to take else and that is not in your best interest. 

 It is therefore best to avoid putting things in those alternatives. I 

 think there are a number of alternatives. One is that you set through 

 the U.N., perhaps, guidelines as to how the nations should act in a 

 period of time of emergence of the exploitation and the penetrations. 



Mr. Fraser. So there might be an evolutionary role? 



Mr. Hanna. Yes, an evolutionary role in the U.N. They could be an 

 ad^dser and forum to take care of individual disputes as they occur 

 but not be the final decisionmaker as to what the pattern of emer- 

 gence will be, because I think that is best left to the process itself. 

 That is the answer to the first question. 



