89 



In summary, the most essential element of any set of rules is the best 

 guarantee of exclusive rights that the exploiter will need to operate 

 efficiently on the sea floor. In am talking here primarily of the area 

 beyond the edge of the continental shelf. 



Now, the second criterion is that of acceptability and how we can 

 arrive at sets of rules that will be, in the long run, acceptable to those 

 nations which will have an influence on decisions. 



I think both of these criteria are exceedingly important in discussing 

 the rules and regulations. Obviously security is also another important 

 criterion and the question of scientific exploration and many other 

 criteria that can be brought into consideration. 



I will now suggest the different alternatives in very broad terms 

 as a basis for discussion. I can see that there are four possibilities. 

 Actually I think the final result will be a mixture of several of these; 

 it will be made up of an array of decisions, but for simplification pur- 

 poses I will outline these four as if they were distinct. 



One is, let's wait and see what happens. Let's leave the present 

 rules as they stand, and let the experience develop and the law fol- 

 low that. 



The present rules governing the operations beyond the edge of the 

 continental shelf are simply those of exploitability and adjacency. We 

 can acquire exclusive rights out as far as we can exploit so long as there 

 is some degree of adjacency to our coastal waters. This is the essential 

 meaning of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 



Now, the limits perhaps are already extended beyond the 200-meter 

 isobath. Fifteen nations have already licensed mining operations be- 

 yond this depth. The United States has licensed operations off the 

 coast of California in 4,000 feet of water 40 miles from the coast, and 

 off the coast of Oregon, 30 miles from the coast, in 1,500 feet of water. 

 So essentially we are already, through the criteria of exploitability and 

 adjacency, pushing out the limits of the coastal states' rights. 



The effect of this is like lowering the water in a bathtub. When we 

 extend our rights into, say, 4,000 feet of water, all other nations acquire 

 the same rights under the principle of the Geneva Convention. This 

 may be reasonable in terms of small increments, but there is certainly 

 question as to when we abandon the principle of adjacency and move 

 beyond. Also, in terms of large steps, there is a question of who has 

 the right to resources beyond the coastal states' limits (however 

 defined), and this, I think, actually does act as a deterrent at the 

 moment to the exploration and exploitation. 



Tlie second approach is the national lake approach. If the first ap- 

 proach were followed to its ultimate conclusion and the principle of 

 adjacency were abandoned, we would arrive at a situation something 

 like this [pointing to map] or some other scheme under which there 

 is a division of the sea floor among the coastal states. 



(The map referred to facing this page shows division of the floor 

 of the oceans along lines every point of which is equal in distance to 

 the nearest points of adjacent or opposite coastal states, including 

 islands.) 



The scheme that I have presented here is simply on the basis of 

 median lines as proposed in the Geneva Convention. That is, along 

 these lines every point is equal in distance to the adjacent or opposite 

 coast of the state. 



